Partnerships and Resource Mobilisation

A Partnership Review for the Global WASH Cluster

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Acronyms

ACAPS – Assessment Capacities Project
ACF – Action Contre La Faim
AoR - Areas of Responsibility
CashCap – Cash Capacity Roster (for humanitarian cash programming)
CAST – Cluster Advisory and Support Team
CC – Cluster Coordinator
CDC – Centre for Disease Control
CLA – Cluster Lead Agency
CO – Country Office
DfID – Department for International Development
DSA – Daily Subsistence Allowance
ECHO – European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ELRHA R2H2 – Enhancing Learning and Research for Humanitarian Assistance, Research for Heath in Humanitarian Crises
EMOPs – Unicef's Office of Emergency Programmes
ERT – Emergency Response Team
FEWS NET - Famine Early Warning Network
FST – Field Support Team
FT – fixed term
FTS – Financial Tracking System
GCC – Global Cluster Coordinator
GENCap – Gender Capacity Roster
GWC – Global WASH Cluster
GWCSP – Global WASH Cluster Strategic Plan
HAC – Humanitarian Action for Children Appeal
HR – Human Resources
HRP – Humanitarian Response Plan
HSD – Humanitarian Surge Deployment
HSP – Humanitarian Support Personnel
IASC – Inter Agency Steering Commitee
IM – Information Management
IMO – Information Manager
IRT – Immediate Response Team
JMP – (Unicef/WHO) Joint Monitoring Project
KM – Knowledge Management
LSHTM – London School of Hygiene and Tropical Management
M&E – Monitoring & Evaluation
MDG – Millennium Development Goals
MICS - Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MSB - Myndigheten För Samhällsskydd och Beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency)
NCA – Norwegian Church Aid

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NY – New York
OFDA – Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PCA – (Unicef) Programme Cooperation Agreement
PD – Programme Division
PROCap – Protection Capacity Roster
RECAs – Regional Emergency Cluster Advisors
RRT – Rapid Response Team
SAG – Strategic Advisory Group
SBP – Standby Partner
SDG – Sustainable Development Goals
SO – Special Operations
STAIT – Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team
SWA – Sanitation and Water for All
TA – Temporary Appointment
UNICEF – United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS - United Nations Office for Project Services
VAM – Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (WFP)
WASH – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WEDC – Water, Engineering and Development Centre, Loughborough University
WFP – World Food Programme
WHS – World Humanitarian Summit

Introduction

1. The cluster approach was one of a number of humanitarian reform initiatives borne out of the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review, with the Global WASH Cluster (GWC) becoming one of the first operational clusters. This review sits within a framework of a number of strategies and reviews that have taken place.

2. An initial GWC strategy in 2006 was followed by a review in 2007[1], and a five-year strategic plan was developed in 2011. Two overall Cluster Approach evaluations took place in 2007 and 2010. In 2013, UNICEF produced an evaluation of its Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) role across all of its cluster and Areas of Responsibility (AoR) responsibilities. Following a commissioned work that evaluated the support to national WASH cluster coordination platforms, a GWC 'lessons learned' workshop was held in 2014. A comparative analysis of the sustainability and cost-efficiency of UNICEF-led clusters/AoRs. An internal review of the 2011 Interim Organizational Structure was also carried out in the second half of 2016. An independent consultation of GWC partners early in 2016, produced a draft new five-year plan 2016–2020, which was further discussed at the 2016 GWC Annual Meeting in Nepal and finalised early 2017.

3. This work was commissioned to support the implementation of the GWC Strategic Plan 2016–2020.

Terms of Reference

Purpose

Within the framework of the GWC strategic plan 2016–2020, the purpose of the overall consultancy was twofold:

a. To strengthen partnership arrangements to ensure predictability and accountability in the GWC operational support to national humanitarian WASH coordination structures, as prescribed in the Transformative Agenda.

b. To widen the scope of resource mobilization efforts in order to ensure a secure and stable funding source to implement the strategy.

Objectives

c. To recommend optimal working arrangements among GWC partners that would optimize mutual accountability and maximize efficiency and predictability of the GWC operational support to national humanitarian coordination structures.

d. To outline potential roles and contributions of the GWC partners in the framework of the GWC strategic plan 2016–2020.

e. To identify financial mechanisms, minimum resources required, and set up a resource mobilization strategy to support the roll-out of the GWC strategic plan 2016–2020.

The full ToRs can be found in Annex 1.

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[1] Review of the Global WASH Cluster Strategy', Jeremy Loveless and Jonathan Hecke, Swiss Resource Centre and Consultancies for Development, May 2007

4. The ToRs were originally conceived to be carried out by a team of two people; one with a focus on partnerships and the other concentrating more on the resource mobilisation components. Unfortunately the resource mobilisation work was unable to be completed, and the Cluster Advisory and Support Team (CAST) is looking at alternative ways to implement this important research.

5. An inception report was produced to validate the understanding of the consultants. Early in the interview process it became clear that many of partners of the GWC did not have an in-depth familiarity with the draft GWC strategic plan 2016–2020, and most had not contemplated how they might contribute to the strategy; this was highlighted in the inception report. Where opportunities to contribute broadly were identified, these were noted and have been shared separately with CAST.

6. Three other complementary reports (listed below in the methodology) were compiled in order to support time-sensitive discussions largely centred on the GWC annual meeting in Nepal. *This report therefore focuses largely on the partnership objectives of the work, as highlighted above*

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Methodology

1. The review was largely carried out largely through around 100 in-depth (1–2 hour) interviews. Many were carried out in person in Geneva or during the GWC and Emergency Environmental Health meetings in Nepal. Most were carried out by skype or phone, but were the same length. A full list of consultations can be found in Annex 2

2. Meetings included attendance at an FST managers meeting, a discussion of UNICEF clusters on organizational structure, the GWC Annual Meeting and the Emergency Environmental Health Forum.

3. An online anonymous survey of past and present FST/RRT members was carried out and the findings integrated into the report. A report of the survey has also been produced separately and shared with CAST.

4. Four interim documents were produced during the review prior to the GWC meeting which complement this report:

    (i) An Inception report to validate the understanding of the ToRs.

    (ii) Initial Inputs to the GWC Ways of Working Document; a review of the draft document produced for the SAG on the future organizational structure of the GWC.

    (iii) Overview of Issues Raised to Date in Consultations.

    (iv) Presentation to the GWC meeting based on the content of the consultations to date, to feed into discussions to take place surrounding the GWC strategy.

5. An overview of potential partnerships raised through consultations has been produced separately.

6. Regular meetings were also held with the GWC Coordinator to give feedback and gain direction.

7. An overview of the types/groupings of interviewees is listed in the table below and the full list found in Annex 2:

CAST (3, including previous)	FST Managers (6) and FST Manager	Longer-Term WASH Actors (2)	UNICEF Dept Director EMOPS	UNICEF's Standby Partner Unit (EMOPS) (3)
Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) Members (6 plus CAST)	FST Members (partial, 4; 20 by survey))	Other Networks and RRTs (3)	UNICEF's Global Cluster Coordination Unit Manager (EMOPS)	UNICEF's Inter-Cluster Information Management Unit (EMOPS) (2)
GWC Operational Agencies (26)	Global Cluster Coordinators (11 including co-leads)	Donors close to GWC[2] (5)	UNICEF COs – users of the FST/SBP (10)	UNICEF's Private Sector Division Dept Director
GWC Associates – Academic Institutes (3)	OCHA (various, 4)	Other related Humanitarian Organisations (4)	UNICEF Emergency Surge, Human Resources (2)	UNICEF Global & Regional (Emergency)WASH Advisers (5)
GWC Observers (2)		Individual Associated Humanitarians (4)		Cluster Coordinators in the Field (8)

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Report Structure

8. This report style gives a specific focus on the recommendations and then their justification, to make the report more change focused and easier to read.

9. The report begins with an Overview of Findings focused around the optimal working arrangements, the objective of the ToRs, which gathers findings around:

    i.   Optimum Mutual Accountability

    ii. Maximum Efficiency and Effectiveness and

    iii. Maximum Predictability

10. A chapter on Partnerships and ways forward for the GWC, begins the main part of the report.

11. The chapters of the report include recommendations for:

    i.   Strategic Utilisation and Appropriate Structures of the GWC Structures and Strategic Utilisation of GWC Structures.

    ii. Increasing Operational Relevance of the Cluster and Strategic Approaches to Increasing An Effective (Quality, Accountable) and Comprehensive WASH Response.

    iii. Cluster Advocacy and Support Team (CAST).

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[2] Given that resource mobilisation was being covered by another consultant, it had been decided to wait for this consultant to go beyond those closer to the GWC)

      iv.   Quality, Effective, Predictable and Efficient Coordination Capacity.

12. The chapter on effective coordination required more significant analysis work and therefore a large amount of narrative is provided outside of the table of recommendations.

13. Each recommendation is allocated a colour coding to indicate the degree of implementation urgency or the level of effort/difficulty required to implement it:

Important and Urgent		Important		Quick Win	

Those indicated in blue as quick-wins does not indicate necessarily a lower important, they may just be more simple to implement, but have significant impact

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Overview of Findings on Optimum Working Arrangements

Optimum Mutual Accountability
Refocusing and Reinvigorating the GWC Partnership

14. Reinforcing mutual accountability within a partnership requires a clear understanding of motivations for entering into the partnership, a commitment to the aims and objectives, trust and an understanding of power relations. Within motivations, there needs to be a component where all parties are meeting some of their own organisational objectives from the partnership, in order for sufficient commitment to be made.

15. Along with clear roles and responsibilities, structure and the interaction between structures, trust within the partnership can be supported by a clear accountability framework – setting out how structures of the partnership will demonstrate accountability. Key to supporting trust is ensuring that the accountability mechanisms have a means by which they can be monitored and held to account.

16. In order to secure organisational commitment, engagement beyond WASH representatives to senior management can be an important factor. Several organisations indicated that their senior management had limited awareness of the GWC, or what might be expected of them, and therefore struggled to participate fully. Recognition, however, should be given to organisations that participate actively at the country level, often taking on co-lead and sub-national roles, but find it more difficult to participate at the global level, often as they are single-person or small global teams, often with high deployment rates. A direct mapping of these important country-level contributions would be useful in being able to give credit to these organisations, but also to review how these critical roles could be more systematically and systemically supported to be filled more rapidly, consistently, and with quality trained staff.

17. A presentation by the CLA to the GWC and their senior management, of what is being done across the organisation to support its cluster lead role (including the current 55 dedicated and 82 double-hatted staffed cluster roles at country level),[3] as well as the value it places on its partnerships (including the 25 and 11 deployments from the FST and SBP respectively in 2016 and unmapped contributions from partners in co-lead and sub-national roles), would support dialogue on the partnership and commitment.

18. Allocating time to take stock with the GWC's core operational and support partners (including their senior management) to review motivations, needs and wants and clarify expectations and commitment needed is essential. This reinvigoration of the partnership and reaffirmation of commitments to its aims and objectives would likely produce more fruitful engagement across the GWC and in the achievement of its strategic plan. An overview of potential partnerships raised through consultations has been produced separately. The revision of the working arrangements document and team-building of the revised SAG membership also offer additional opportunities for reinvigoration and commitment.

Increasing the Operational Relevance of the GWC

19. There is a demand from the core operational partners of the GWC to increase the operational profile and relevance of the GWC. Whilst CAST is constantly involved in supporting coordination

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[3] Figures are made up of international and national UNICEF staff posts (80%) and consultants (20%), more detail can be found in the chapter on Coordination Capacity

teams at country level (as well as member of the FST), the broader GWC agencies are little involved on an inter-agency level. There are, however, a number of opportunities to increase this involvement in supporting in-country WASH clusters, as well as identifying learning for the sector more broadly.

20. Time-pertinent teleconferences could link country and global level WASH clusters, reviewing responses and how the GWC, including its donor supporters, could support specific responses (e.g. scaling-up response, advocacy around sector funding gaps and its impact on critical country responses, facilitating rapid sub-national coordination). WASH peer monitoring and learning reviews of responses through both the global and country WASH networks also bring opportunities to bring the sector together around operations.

21. In becoming more operationally relevant, organisations will have a renewed sense of importance of the GWC and will therefore be potentially more willing to engage at country and global levels in the broader work of the (G)WC.

Maximise Efficiency and Effectiveness
More Ambitious Advocacy Agenda to Effect Change

22. Whilst there is some practical recognition of the importance of WASH response in humanitarian contexts, its profile when it comes to funding levels (4% of all humanitarian funding, country appeals funded on average to 40%, source FTS), monitoring of the impact on WASH, its importance in relation to supporting other sectors (e.g Nutrition, Health, Protection) is low.

23. Other sectors have increased their profile through high-level campaigns such as 'Education Cannot Wait' and 'Scaling up Nutrition'. In the development sector, WASH has had success in running specific campaigns, however no one interviewed could remember a specific humanitarian WASH campaign.

24. Other sectors have well-established monitoring systems in place in humanitarian settings to support evidence-based responses and fundraising eg Nutrition (SMART), Food Security (FEWS NET, VAM, IPC)), Health. WASH has the JMP, but significantly, no specific monitoring and reporting for countries or areas in protracted crises. Unicef introduced its flagship advocacy document 'The State of the World's Children Report' in 1980; FEWS NET provides evidence-based analysis in 35 countries; the Global Shelter Cluster will produce its first 'State of the World's Humanitarian Shelter and Settlement Report' in 2017 to support its ability to advocate for the sector. Often donors will ask for evidence of impact in humanitarian and natural disasters, but WASH data is rarely monitored consistently enough to enable the sector to advocate strongly.

25. Data and evidence are the backbone to supporting any advocacy campaign and currently the humanitarian WASH sector is not in a strong position. However, there are opportunities to explore potential linkages with some existing systems, without having to start a monitoring system from scratch. Some already collect WASH information. The JMP is interested to review what relevant data exists to produce its first humanitarian WASH report, which would then outline gaps and a way forward. UNHCR also have a WASH monitoring system for its refugee camps which could potentially be duplicated for camps in non-refugee settings. UNICEF is also looking to develop a humanitarian WASH campaign which has the potential to become more of an inter-agency campaign.

26. To support the GWC develop a more ambitious agenda for the humanitarian WASH sector, it would be hugely helpful to have a set of senior advisers who could assist in the development of this agenda, but importantly, also be high-profile advocates for the humanitarian WASH sector. The group could include, for example, senior communication and advocacy specialists, successful entrepreneurs, senior donor representatives, members of governments with a particular track record in progressing WASH, as well as senior managers/humanitarian directors of GWC partners (perhaps particularly those with access to SCHR, the IASC Emergency Directors Group or similar) and the GWC CLA. This group would then have a link to the GWC through meeting with representatives of the GWC SAG.

Focus in on Quality and Effective WASH Response

27. As mentioned, there is already a demand from partners for the GWC to become more operationally relevant and involved. There is also a demand for a broadening of what has seemed like a focus on coordination issues, particularly for those agencies that are not involved in directly supporting the FST. There is a hypothesis that because the largest agencies are involved in the FST (often, as well the SAG), this means that those with the greatest capacity are perhaps distracted by the FST and find it difficult to focus on other important aspects of WASH that need to be addressed.

28. Whilst coordination plays a critical role in supporting WASH response quality and effectiveness, there is a need to go beyond coordination support to include a focus on the quality and effectiveness of response through, for example, peer or dedicated monitoring and learning and reducing the constant 'reinventing of the wheel' in WASH response through improving knowledge management within the sector.

29. To be really accountable to people affected by crisis, the sector has a responsibility to ensure that its responses are high quality, but also effective in their intentions. Whilst this remains primarily an agency responsibility, peer or dedicated monitoring (along with action plans) can bring an additional quality and dimension through the sharing of good practice and learning to provide real-time support to improve response. Such practices have proved successful in responses in CAR.

30. Poor knowledge management in the sector was raised by many as having a significant impact on the quality and effectiveness of response, as well as speed. Reinventing designs of responses, particularly in excreta disposal and hygiene promotion, were cited as areas where a lot of time was spent and wasted. If we look at the mapping of gaps in the emergency WASH sector,[4] several identified areas where there has already been a lot of work (e.g. latrines in locations where no pits are possible (urban, high water table/flooding), emptying and desludging of latrines). Are there gaps in solutions or are they found in how we share and ensure implementation of the knowledge that already exists? Some have suggested that technical solutions are often described too briefly and do not provide the step-by-step technical support that is needed. Researchers and practitioners also cited the lack of an 'evidence to implementation road map' for new evidence and knowledge that is developed – ensuring that we don't stop at writing papers, but that the knowledge is turned into something practical and the sector finds ways to agree to implement new knowledge (and monitor it), perhaps taking lessons from how the health sector does this on a regular basis.

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[4] Gap Analysis in Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion, Bastable and Russell, 2013

31. Whilst supportive of market and cash-based interventions to support WASH outcomes, there are concerns to ensure, particularly where unconditional cash is used, that WASH outcomes are being achieved. Academic institutes would be natural partners in developing such a monitoring programme and there are potential opportunities to work with CashCAP to access human resources to support GWC cash work.

32. The Transformative Agenda demanded that the cluster system should refocus on operational coordination and less on process. However, Cluster Coordinators (from all sectors) complain of how the demand for products and processes administered through OCHA for Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) does exactly the opposite, without clarity on whether they really do support a better, more coordinated response – particularly given that at least 50% of funds given to country responses are outside the coordinated humanitarian appeal and funds are not always directed to priority responses. A review of this is needed for the humanitarian system as a whole, and could be called for by CLAs and partners through their Emergency Directors and Principles. WASH could also lead the way in gathering initial evidence to advocate for a wider review.

More Effective and Efficient Coordination Capacity

33. The FST has shown its relative importance in being the principal way in which coordination capacity is supported, both in numbers[5], but also as the faster principal mechanism for speed of response[6]. Whilst the quality of the FST is also noted as higher than other mechanisms[7], there is still as sense that there needs to be some higher level of capacity with the team.

34. In order to support this, it is necessary to look more broadly than the one NGO consortium model that has largely been employed by the GWC to support the FST, to a variety of models to enable a more diverse and experienced team. Some of the funds being directed to coordination capacity (not just the NGO consortium) could be used to employ more experience people on consultancy contracts. These funds could be directed for deployment-only agreements, shared amongst a number of experienced WASH coordinators/IM, potentially enabling a higher rate of deployment overall[8]. Some partners may also be interested in contributing an FST member to the team, but for a different % of deployment. What is important is the predictability of that % and therefore as long as this was assured, then there should be no reason not to include them into the FST.

35. Efforts need to be made to review the management of the FST. Many members have found the management confusing and lacking in parts. Ensuring that FST members are trained in coordination and IM will increase the effectiveness of the team, and give confidence that the FST is of value and the team worth investing in.

36. The introduction of senior-level coordinators and IM members into the FST also offers the ability to support higher-profile responses, and could also form part of greater support and mentoring for more junior members of the FST.

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[5] 67% (25) WASH coordination responses through FST, 30% (11) through Standby Partners and 3% (1) through internal Unicef mechanisms in 2016)

[6] Users of the FST noted that they faster to deploy than SBPs and often faster than internal redeployment capacity (there is no coordination capacity in Unicef's ERT or IRT)

[7] More predictable quality than the SBP – not enough redeployments have occurred recently to make comparisons

[8] The deployment rate of FST members can be as low as 60% of 9 months (162 days)

37. The non-deployment time is split as 20% for the deploying agency and 20% for the GWC. It is apparent that neither the agency nor the GWC is able to use their time effectively since it is largely unpredictable and spread out over 12 months. It is also the reason given by CAST as to why it is difficult to integrate FST members into GWC work; not being able to apply learning from the field is one of the frustrations expressed by past and present FST/RRT members[9]. It is therefore proposed to give the full 40% of work to the GWC, thus allowing the FST member to be better integrated into a Global Support Team (CAST), or allowing the agency to contribute to the salary of the FST member to gain the full 40%.

38. The SBPs also makes an important contribution to coordination capacity, which could potentially be tapped into in order to increase the quality and predictability of coordination capacity. On the quality improvement side, this could include greater collaboration with these partners to invest in some of their higher calibre roster members, ensuring they are trained, have the potential for mentoring, have access to latest tools and information, are properly supported when in the field and fully connected to other coordinators and information managers to share experiences.

39. An aspect which is important to be able to incorporate to warrant investing in an SBP roster members is predictability. Given that several of the SBPs already contribute a large number of deployment days (4,074 days in 2015/16 and an average of 120 days per deployment, compared to the FST of 1,809 with an average of 46 days per deployment), arrangements could be made to secure an agreed number of months of deployment over a year. Some partners may have a specific regional interest and flexibility could be applied to support such an integration into the FST.

40. Information Management (IM) is a profile that is often in short supply. There could also be additional opportunities to work with SBPs to develop this capacity further within their roster, incorporating greater training opportunities and support from the GWC.

41. Since there is no IM capacity within CAST, there are opportunities to draw upon the IM capacity within the Information Management Unit of Unicef's Inter-Cluster Coordination Unit, for greater support for IM.

42. GWC partners also raised the issue that sub-national coordination, that which is nearest to the point of assistance support, is not always of the best quality, if it exists at all. There is a call to increase the quality and availability of sub-national coordinators, but also make their deployment more systemic. There are opportunities to work with country-level coordinators, GWC operational partners who have provided (or who may be interested to provide) such capacity at country level, and donors, to make discussions on sub-national coordination at the beginning or heightening of a crisis more systematic, thus increasing the quality and effectiveness of coordination and response.

Right-Sizing and Reformulation of CAST and Reviewing How Unicef Meets its CLA Role

43. In the past, the different aspects of UNICEF's WASH CLA role was played by different parts of the organisation, including the WASH Section in Programme Division, EMOPS and UNICEF Regional Offices. The Region Emergency WASH Adviser (REWAs) positions were initiated through support from ECHO to support the role out of the cluster approach, to support cluster coordination in-country and capacity-building in relation to the cluster. With more mainstreaming of these positions by UNICEF, and in particular with the introduction of the NGO-supported Regional Cluster Advisers (RECAs), the support role for clusters transferred to these positions. When the

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[9] Online Survey of Past and Present FST/RRT members carried out for this consultancy

RECA positions were no longer funded, there was no agreed hand back of responsibilities and none of the current REWAs have cluster support in their job descriptions.

44. As a result, CAST (two people) provides the support for coordination teams in the field across the globe; this doesn't follow the usual accountability route between CO and HQ and is ultimately unsustainable. Importantly, it also means that CAST is restricted in their ability to follow-up on other more proactive/strategic work in moving the GWC forward. The evaluation of UNICEF's CLA role (the CLARE report) also noted that the role of UNICEF's regional offices was unclear and recommended this be addressed. Whilst guidance for responsibilities of UNICEF country offices (COs) has been developed, the role of the regional offices is yet to be agreed.

45. More capacity is certainly needed within CAST and it is interesting to note that other non-UNICEF led clusters, sometimes with less activated clusters at country level, have more human resources within their global support (e.g Shelter, Health, Food Security, Logistics) (Annex 8).

46. In order to reformulate CAST, it could be helpful to consider a 'Global Support Team' approach which incorporates the capacity allotted through the FST members (those with 40% support to GWC) and the FST manager. However, given that there is much work to be done in taking the GWC forward, an additional two staff (or equivalent) for two to three years should be considered to be able to: increase and accelerate partnerships; support expanded advocacy and a Friends of WASH group with global humanitarian WASH monitoring to support this; increase operational engagement with GWC partners; have a greater focus on quality and effectiveness of response, increase operational learning; monitor the effectiveness of Cash responses in meeting WASH objectives; develop the FST and SBP capacity; potentially engage more with regional offices to take on the responsibility to support country clusters; and support other aspects of the GWC strategy.

47. As well as the potential for additional support from a greater percentage of FST time (as well as maximising the usefulness of this non-deployment time), CAST could look to GWC partners and SBP for human resource contributions to increase the capacity of CAST. NRC, as well as other partners, was interested to talk about potential contribution to the FST, but also how the CashCap roster could support the cash/market-based work of the cluster. The contribution of the CLA to this expansion will also be important.

48. Whilst there is some optimisation and streamlining of roles and responsibilities between the Global Cluster Coordinator and the Deputy, there is also a need to clarify the management of FST members who have found it somewhat confusing. It would also be helpful to mainstream if the new FST manager had a coordination background, so was able to take on a greater role in supporting them in the field, releasing CAST to support and intervene on more strategic issues.

49. At the same time as expanding CAST (or the Global Support Team (GST)), there is a need for greater integration of CAST/GST into broader UNICEF work and activities both with the WASH Section, with other divisions and regions to ensure the voice of UNICEF's CLA responsibilities is heard, and also to maximise the potential for benefiting from inputs and resources from other parts of the organisation. There is potentially the opportunity to expand the 'compacts' that are being agreed between different parts of UNICEF. These set out what services or support they will provide, but also what they will work together on, with the aim of ensuring the CLA responsibilities are clear, more shared and mainstreamed throughout the organisation. Taking this further, there are opportunities to develop service 'charters' between the GWC and country WASH Clusters, between Cluster coordination teams in the field and CAST/GST.

Overview of Structures of the Global WASH Cluster

Maximise Predictability
Predictable Leadership in WASH Support and Services

50. In many other sectors, leadership for different components of needed capacity or skills has been developed by a specific group, institute or organisation, bringing both a division of labour but particularly a sense of predictability and reliability that the sector can rely on within the specific leadership role it takes on within the sector, importantly also raising its own resources (e.g. FEWS NET, Emergency Nutrition Network, VAM (WFP), SMART). Given the vast scope of WASH, the concept of different groups, institutes or agencies agreeing to take on a leadership role of a specific aspect of WASH could be beneficial in developing capacity and support services for the sector as well as a predictability that operational agencies can rely on. The uptake of the SMART methodology for nutritional surveys noted that a lack of institutional leadership of SMART had hampered its development and implementation. Consequently, ACF Canada took on the project convenor and training role, linking the technical advisory group, users and experts, ensuring capacity-building and the uptake of SMART in nutrition surveys across the world, whilst bringing a host of experts to the table and its own funding. A similar initiative has been implemented for many years by WHO with its Centres of Collaboration.

51. There are many aspects of WASH which are immediately ripe for this leadership, predictability and division of labour to develop capacity and support services for the sector (e.g. coordination training, WASH monitoring, vector control, nutrition and WASH). The capacity of academic institutions and operational agencies in WASH has not been fully utilised in taking on leadership roles.

Predictability of the FST

52. Much time and energy has been used by CAST, the SAG and the NGO Consortium in ensuring the continuation of the FST. It could be said, perhaps, diverting it from other critical aspects of ensuring a quality and effective response. The importance and the reliance on the FST in providing first-phase response for coordination, already highlighted above, means that it is

important that the predictability of the FST is somewhat assured to allow longer contracting and investment in the team and its management.

53. The FST has been funded by donors for more than eight years and there is some expectation of mainstreaming a critical and ongoing function.

54. In reviewing both CLA and GWC partner rapid response mechanisms, whilst some flexibility is needed, there is almost always a full, or in some cases, partial, cost-recovery mechanism implemented, once a proof of concept has been delivered. It would therefore be normal that the very first RRT of all global clusters would need to move to both securing predictability in the longer term as well as looking at a cost recovery mechanism from funds raised for emergency responses at country level. Whilst this has been done to greater and lesser degrees in other global clusters, such as eg Logistics and Food Security, this has not been done on any consistent basis by UNICEF-led clusters.

55. Whilst other UNICEF clusters have been partially funded by UNICEF's own unearmarked funds, this has not been the case for the GWC in recent times, but it does indicate that a conversation is now needed within UNICEF on how to progress in both assuring predictability as well as cost recovery in support of ensuring an effective quality humanitarian WASH response.

56. Data presented above identified that given that there are no ERT or IRT coordination positions within UNICEF, and only one internal redeployment of staff to take up the cluster coordination role in 2016. Whilst a cost recover system would be a logical way forward to ensure the future of the FST, a number of other decisions needs to be made which may affect the decision.

    i. Recognition by the CLA of the importance the FST plays in meeting rapid response cluster coordination roles and the critical role played by partners using the data provided in this report.

    ii. Review what role UNICEF's internal resources should play in providing rapid response for cluster/sector coordination roles, the contributions SBPs make and the staff that UNICEF engage in longer-term protracted crises.

    iii. Potentially underwriting the FST to give it medium to longer-term predictability and allow investment in the team.

    iv. Review how new donors could be brought on board (with support from Unicef's Funding and Partnership divisions).

    v. Make a decision on whether a cost recovery system is the way forward for UNICEF's clusters[10]

    vi. Move more quickly to partial cost recovery in terms of DSA and flight costs from funds raised by country offices before a full cost recovery system is in place.

    vii. Identify mechanisms by which costs can be recovered for FST costs from country resources raised for the emergency, as is done for UNICEF's HSP (e.g. through simple Funding Commitments, PCAs or Long Term Agreements(LTAs))[11]. We know there are several ways of doing this, but the best route will depend on other decisions made regarding the future of the FST.

    viii. Explore how tools such as the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) can help to ensure no delays in deploying teams.

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[10] Whilst the GWC is ready to implement a cost recovery system, other UNICEF-led cluster may not be in the same position.

[11] Attempts were made to engage with Operations Officers to review potential mechanisms, but this was not successful.

Review Internal UNICEF Responsibilities for Cluster Lead Agency Responsibilities for WASH

57. There have been changes in where the overall CLA responsibilities sit within UNICEF, moving from Programme Division to EMOPs in 2012. After this change, a clear role for Programme Division was not outlined. The responsibilities of UNICEF COs for cluster leadership were also outlined in a guidance document of 2015, but the same guidance demanded by the CLARE Report in 2013 to clarify the role of UNICEF's regional offices has not been developed.

58. It has become clear when reviewing some of the longer-term capacity-building functions needed to support humanitarian WASH sector/cluster coordination, that this responsibility does not make sense for a two-person global team whose focus is more on ongoing emergencies, particularly protracted crises and less on longer-term capacity-building needs where minimum conditions and capacity of government are needed before moving ahead.

59. WASH Cluster Coordinators and Information Managers do not have a natural global or regional Unicef Section to support capacity-building or technical support, as WASH programme staff do. Whilst there are WASH Sections at both global and regional levels which could (and should) incorporate WASH Cluster Coordinators relatively easily, there is no such section to support IMOs, although an Inter-Cluster Information Manager does exist within the Global Inter-Cluster Coordination Unit (GCCU). It was recently noted that a dedicated HR officer for IMO recruitment has also been put in place, although currently with limited linkages to the GCCU. There are potentially many linkages between the work of cluster IMOs and UNICEF monitoring and evaluation officers; it is worth exploring if there should be stronger linkages between the two in order to strengthen preparedness and capacity of country offices in supporting information management needs of clusters.

60. What has clearly come to light is that the broad responsibilities for the WASH CLA role (and other sectors), particularly going beyond direct coordination support, needs to be discussed in greater depth across UNICEF and is not only an EMOPS and Programme Division discussion. The issue of internal support for fundraising for cluster has also been raised as a gap. A full mapping of CLA roles and responsibilities, going beyond the 2006 guidance note on the role of CLA, would be helpful in facilitating this. A greater sharing (and clarity) of the CLA roles and responsibilities would also likely facilitate the integration of the cluster approach across the organisation.

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Partnerships and the Global WASH Cluster

61. The GWC is over ten years old and is known for having one of the strongest cluster partnership groups of key operational agencies; one many global clusters have wanted to emulate. To take greater steps forward, there needs to be an analysis of the GWC partnership - an honest assessment of where the GWC sits among the 'continuum of partnerships'; is the environment of the GWC 'enabling' partners to move forward in the continuum, facilitating and creating space for true collaboration?

Continuum based on:
- commitment
- change required
- risk involved
- levels of interdependence
- power
- trust
- willingness to share turf

Networking

Coordinating

Cooperating

Collaborating

62. How convinced are key partners in the objectives of the cluster? How committed are partners to reach these objectives and importantly, how committed (convinced) are senior managers to make investments in common goals?

63. The areas of WASH that need to be developed in order to move closer towards objectives are significant. In order to progress with many of these in any sort of realistic and timely manner it is essential that those committed to the partnership take greater roles, taking the lead on key components of what needs to be done. It is also paramount that the CLA integrate itself further to support any achievements.

64. In any partnership, it is not only understanding the roles and responsibilities of each, but an honest appreciation of motivation and what each partner needs or wants from the partnership to be able to progress.

65. A number of different criteria for a good partnership were compiled from the range of interviews undertaken for this review (both internal and external to the GWC), which may be helpful for the GWC and CAST to consider in further partnership discussions/decisions.

1. Honesty
2. Trust
3. Transparency
4. Showcasing work of partners – global and country level; visibility for partners
5. Meet the objectives of all parties
6. Giving credit to partners for work done/support
7. Independence of partnership
8. Involvement in determining direction and strategy
9. Tangible contribution to operational responses

Partner Challenges for Greater Levels of Participation and Ways Forward

66. Several GWC partner WASH representatives find themselves a the only global focal point in the organisation, or part of a small team, often requiring a large amount of (unpredictable) emergency deployment (up to 60% in some cases). This means that they find it difficult to participate in processes that are on-going or to lead on specific areas as they are unable to commit strongly to timetables and be reliable contributors. *There may however, be opportunities to participate in more short-term outputs, including participation in field reviews and learning which are more timebound.*

67. Whilst such organisations have greater challenges to participate actively at global level, they are often active participants at country level in co-lead roles, leading on sub-national coordination, SAGs and TWiGS of WASH Clusters, which should also be given recognition. *There are potential opportunities to capitalise on this active participation at country level in more systematic ways eg more rapid and systematic ways of identifying sub-national coordinators.*

68. Some organisations reported in recent times internal focus and reorganisation which has meant increased workloads in different directions and therefore challenges to be more involved. Some also talked of WASH not being a clear organisational priority and therefore finding it difficult to justify support to the wider sector.

69. Often senior management of Partners have not been engaged in the work of the GWC so there's no particular organisational buy-in. There are instances where senior management have engaged much more proactively in the relationship with the GWC and this has then resulted in a higher quality of engagement.

70. In some instances, those who are on the fringes of the GWC are sometimes there because they feel that the work of the GWC doesn't link sufficiently to operations, their main interest, and therefore have not found it as useful to remain engaged. In many interviews, Partners indicated that they would like to see *greater involvement of the constituency of the GWC in discussions and learning around the quality of response, going beyond coordination to tackle more directly the effectiveness of response.* It's possible that because many of the SAG members are also members of the FST, and that the FST is seen as important, that there has been a lot of attention and preoccupation with the ability to sustain the FST into the future, diverting attention from the broader strategy towards response quality

71. *Greater clarity to Partners of the commitments that UNICEF is making to its CLA role and the value it puts on the partnerships of the GWC would also be helpful in contributing to clarity of partnership and the responsibilities and commitments that it is making.*

72. *There is therefore a lot of feedback from Partners which suggests that greater engagement with partner organisations at a senior management level could be helpful to gain an increased or better quality of involvement in the aims and objectives of the GWC. This would also involve further practical engagement by UNICEF's senior management to support this.*

73. It is clear that there are many opportunities for strengthening partnerships, both internally and externally to the GWC, in order to increase contributions to the aims of the GWC, particularly by taking time to understand each partner, their interests, priorities and limitations. A separate report has compiled a list of these potential partnerships for follow up.

74. Investment in partnerships, however, requires a lot of time and energy, particularly in the set-up phase. Therefore a number of choices need to be made with regard to investment, particularly relating to handing over leadership for areas of the GWC, how CAST is currently sized, structured and organised as well as interaction with partners outside of the SAG and the levels at which other parts of the CLA are integrated and support.

75. We stand at a potential turning point for the GWC; there is an opportunity to move beyond coordination and cooperation into a higher next phase involving deeper collaboration. It is for the partners of the GWC and the CLA to decide if the levels of commitment, trust and confidence are such that the partnership is ready to take that leap. *A number of suggestions of ways forward have been proposed. Allocating time to take-stock with the GWC's core operational and support partners (including their senior management) to reinvigorate and reaffirm commitments to its aims and objectives would likely produce more fruitful engagement in the future, including opportunities with the new SAG to be put in place.*

Strategic Utilisation of GWC Structures and Appropriate and Effective Structure

76. The review and recommendations around Appropriate Structure are within the framework of the 2016 revision of the Interim Organizational Structure (2011), ensuring that the structures of the GWC are 'fit for purpose'. A separate short report[12] was produced in November 2016, giving inputs and recommendations around the draft revision of the organizational structure of the GWC. Not all of those comments are listed here, only those most relevant to the overall work.

77. The second part of the recommendations focuses on whether the GWC can be optimised and used more strategically and effectively to meet the aims of the GWC.

Recommendations

| Important and Urgent | 🟥 | Important | 🟨 | Quick Win | 🟦 |

Those indicated in blue as quick-wins does not indicate necessarily a lower important, they may just be more simple to implement, but have significant impact

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority

Strategic Utilisation of GWC Structures

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
1.	Move to greater involvement of senior management of Global WASH Cluster Partners in committing to the aims and objectives of the WASH cluster at global and country levels	CLA/CAST/ WASH PD	If a gGreater depth of commitment and involvement to the achievement of the objectives of the cluster is important sought at country and global levels, then it is necessary to greater engagement with partners at a higher senior management level is more likely to be able to secure this commitment. Many partners cited that their senior management are not very aware of the work of the GWC and greater engagement in this would raise the potential for their increased involvement, but also has the potential to have increased number and quality of advocates for humanitarian WASH with the ability to engage in higher level advocacy for the sector. The proposal to have a signed letter of commitment from senior management (Humanitarian Director equivalent or CEO) was met positively, particularly from participants who find it difficult giving time to participate, which would, as a first step, engage senior management in a formal discussion about what being part of the GWC means (and 'what's in it' for partners), opening the door to greater quality of participation. These important partners may benefit from greater outreach to their senior management.	🟥

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[12] Initial Inputs to the GWC Ways of Working Document

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			Others (largely those who already actively participate), suggested that if there were aspects of the commitments that weren't being upheld, there would need to be ways to address this, otherwise the commitments would be somewhat empty.	
			Such a group could form part of the ~~be the forming of a~~ Friends of Emergency WASH Group, a proposal for a s'Senior aAdvisory gGroup' for the GWC, discussed in the recommendations in Increasing the Operational Relevance of the GWC and Strategic Approaches to Increasing 'An Effective, Quality, Comprehensive WASH Response for those Affected by Crisis'.	
			~~A Humanitarian Director of a GWC partner has already offered to discuss this on the fringes at upcoming inter-agency platforms, if a concept was developed.~~	
2.	Look for partners of the Global WASH Cluster who can ~~take~~ provide predictable long term leadership ~~the lead~~ to support the sector - to develop excellence, fill capacity gaps and provide services to operational agencies	CLA/CAST/ SAG/GWC	The scale and scope of work that is necessary to support the WASH sector improve its effectiveness and quality is vast.	
			To be able to cover the extent of issues that need to be covered, there needs to be a shift in how work is implemented and in particular how responsibility is shared and taken up. The GWC needs to work much more strongly as a partnership, where different agencies, sharing the same goals, ~~agree to~~ take responsibility to lead on key strategic issues where their comparative advantages are compatible or can be developed. This initiative goes beyond (and does not replace) the short term nature of Working Groups and TWiGs.	
			This leadership of parts of the sector has occurred within other sectors such as Nutrition (the Emergency Nutrition Network taking a specific role in supporting technical support for the sector) and Food Security (Famine Early Warning System Network, Integrated Phase Classification).	
			This agreement to take on leadership in key areas can be time-bound (though the idea would not be short-term) and include explicit output/outcomes/ services ~~related~~. This approach also requires an honest assessment of the maturity of the GWC partnership to understand if the partnership is ready to empower or support leadership development in key areas by individual or groups of organisations/ institutions.	
			One way to develop in areas where there are gaps in capacity or support would be to open out up the idea of leadership in a particular area for a determined period of time, taking on some of the concepts of the WHO Collaborating Centres. Agreements are made with WHO	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			on a four-year renewable cycle to contribute to particular objectives, activities and services, dependent on an initial two-year collaboration[13].	
			Such areas could include: coordination and leadership training of cluster coordinators and information managers; assessment capacity; knowledge management; evidence base for emergency WASH; vector control, where limited capacity exists.	
			With~~in~~ an overall agreed framework ~~the overall support with~~ ~~of~~ the GWC, institutions ~~(academic)~~ or organizations ~~–~~ would develop capacity and provide critical specialist services to the sector identifying their own resources to develop and sustain activities, using the strong branding and framework agreed with the Cluster, becoming WASH Cluster 'Strategic Partners', 'Reference Centres', 'Centres of Excellence' –. It allows groups with specific competencies to invest in excellence to provide needed support and services to the WASH community in a more sustained manner.	
			This approach could develop areas where there are gaps or require specific services to the sector, utilizing natural leaders in these areas, or those willing to make organisational/institutional commitments to invest in developing capacity and excellence.	
3.	Create a 'Friends of WASH senior advisory group for the Global WASH Cluster to support in higher-level global strategic initiatives and advocacy for the WASH Sector	CLA (including WASH-PD) /CAST/ SAG/GWC/ ~~WASH PD~~	The GWC could benefit from the creation of a high-level advisory group that would come together to support the higher strategic aims of the cluster – in getting profile, support ~~the development of~~ strategic initiatives, in resource mobilisation, and ensure that WASH is aware and connected to high-profile advocacy opportunities.	
			This group may include senior management of key WASH partners, senior WASH development personnel, successful entrepreneurs, directors of the CLA and senior country level (government) contributors, ~~and~~ donors and with a number of SAG members represented. The group would work in support of the SAG and the CLA.	
			This approach is also being taken by the Protection Cluster and specific humanitarian initiatives with UNHCR (GBV) have gone for similar models.	
			A Humanitarian Director of a GWC partner has already offered to discuss this on the fringes at upcoming inter-agency platforms, if a concept was to be further developed.	

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[13] WHO Guidance on Collaborating Centres

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
4.	Review partner involvement in the FST and effects on their ability to make other commitments in support of GWC aims	CAST/SAG/ FST agency members	The FST is seen as part of the critical support that the GWC is able to provide to country-level responses. There have also been strong comments that it's also an important expression of partnership within the GWC. Many members of the SAG are also FST consortium members. It could also be seen that the FST is time-consuming for partners and potentially distracting them from their ability to focus on other strategic issues, having an impact on the effectiveness and quality of WASH response. Whilst this interpretation may not be completely correct, it is an important consideration in moving ahead with both the GWC strategy more broadly as well as FST strategies. How important is it to have so many of the largest NGOs involved?	
5.	Increase operational engagement with core operational agencies (including observer agencies[14]) and country level coordination teams to improve quality and effectiveness of response as well as broader involvement of the GWC in providing solutions to field challenges.	CAST/GWC	For agencies who are not part of the SAG or FST consortium, there has been little direct GWC engagement on operational issues. There is a demand from global operational partners to have greater operational relevance for the GWC and engagement ion reviewing WASHfield operational responses.	
			a. At the same time, cCluster/Sector Coordinators interviewed at country level were very satisfied with the engagement and support provided by the GWC but responded indicated extremely positively to the idea that they would find it useful to have of teleconferences on a 'needs' basis which would include broader GWC partners relevant in a specific response, to review the inter-agency response and see review how the GWC can support improving aspects of the response.	
			b. Teleconferences could also be used at the beginning of an emergency to discuss the overall need for coordination support, particularly ensuring quality sub-national coordination rapidly in place (highlighted as a big gap by partners).	
			c. Peer Monitoring Missions by GWC agencies were also proposed to review the quality and effectiveness of a response and how it can be improved. Similar missions in the past have developed a greater sense of 'team' within the GWC, often accompanied by greater involvement of these agencies in other areas of work.	

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[14] Observers include ICRC and MSF

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
6.	Increase strategic engagement with academic institutions (GWC associate members) to further GWC objectives	CAST/SAG/ GWC	To date, there has been little strategic engagement with academic institutions who have been noted as 'associate members'. There is huge potential for maximising partnerships with institutions, to leverage/scale-up WASH work, drawing on their networks, their areas of expertise, their ability to take on long-term commitments and other comparative advantages. For example: - WASH technical expertise (there is a sense that WASH practitioners have become generalists!) - Evidence development and research design for WASH in emergencies (including evidence for coordination) - Knowledge management - Capacity building - Linking and accessing development WASH networks Academic institutions are often able to access different types of funding and to take on longer-term commitments to a specific service or support. *Opportunity*: WEDC reported that more UK aid will be channelled through UK-based research (Global Challenge Research Fund[15]) and indicated opportunities for the WASH cluster to capitalise on this, with £1.5billion and 20 calls already in 8 months.	

Appropriate and Effective GWC Structures

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
7.	Make more explicit the responsibility of the CLA in the new organizational structure of the GWC	CLA/CAST/ SAG	Current documentation on the Organizational Structure of the GWC omits clarity on the responsibility of the CLA. With a move to get greater commitment from partners, this is an important step in the process to ensure commitments on all sides are clear and is necessary to develop more deeply, partnerships in the future . Current documentation mixes the role of CAST (as individuals) and the CLA, which have distinct responsibilities (as do Coordinators and CLA at country level), which needs to be clear within documentation. A description of the responsibility of the CLA can be found in the organizational structure documents for both health and nutrition clusters. Given that UNICEF is also CLA for nutrition, there is already an agreed starting point from which to progress. *A broader discussion of responsibility may be*	

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[15] http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/funding/gcrf/. The Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) is a £1.5 billion fund announced by the UK Government to support cutting-edge research that addresses the challenges faced by developing countries through: (1) challenge-led disciplinary and interdisciplinary research; (2) strengthening capacity for research and innovation within both the UK and developing countries; (3) providing an agile response to emergencies where there is an urgent research need.

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			needed beyond this depending on the results of reviewing the recommendations made in this report.	
8.	Hold a meeting with GWC Partners and their senior management to reinvigorate and reaffirm commitments to the aims and objectives of the GWC.	CLA/CAST/ SAG	There is an opportunity to move beyond coordination and cooperation into a higher next phase of the GWC involving deeper collaboration. It's important to take-stock and understand the motivations and needs/wants of partners in relation to the WASH Cluster to make more sustained progress in the future. It is noted that support from partner's senior management is needed in gaining a reinvigorated involvement and commitment. Support and clarity of commitments from senior management of the CLA is also an important component in taking this forward.	
9.	Team Building of the new SAG and more regular meetings	CLA/CAST/ SAG	It's important that there is a clear understanding of what the desires and motivations of the SAG members are for the GWC for the future and important for setting the right foundation to focus in on strategic issues implementing the new strategy. Membership of the SAG is an important contribution to supporting the achievement of the GWC strategy - a refreshed and positive mindset, clear expectations of SAG and CAST as well as ways of working will be critical in taking the SAG forward with this objective in mind. Spending time in building this team approach is an important investment in support of meeting the aims and objectives of the GWC. Efforts also need to be made by the SAG to broaden the involvement of other agencies and constituents of the GWC. More regularly planned meetings (minimum every 2 months) (teleconferences and agreed number of face-to-face meetings) of the SAG will assist in developing the new SAG team and assist in follow-up of issues (the Shelter Cluster SAG met 11 times in 2016).	
8.1	Look beyond WASH capacities of GWC Partners to maximise and leverage partner expertise capacity to support country WASH clusters and the work of the Global WASH Cluster	GWC Partners/ CAST	The additional capacity/comparative advantage of member organizations beyond WASH is not being leveraged to the benefit of the sector response, e.g. Care's gender capacity, Oxfam's protection capacity, IRC/UNHabitat convening a 'Global Alliance on Urban Crises'. Consider GENCap/PROCap deployments to the GWC in order to provide a more strategic approach to appropriate and accountable responses.	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
9.1	Increase the size and type of composition of the SAG to bring diversity and fresh approaches	CLA/CAST/SAG/GWC	It is already recognised and agreed that there needs to be some refreshment of the SAG. It is recommended to increase the size of the SAG, bringing in a broader range of organizations. There is certainly scope for increasing the size of the SAG (e.g. Shelter has 12 positions). Changes in the SAG would benefit from a transition period so that there is more than one person acting as the institutional memory. It should be made clear why a second UN agency (in addition to UNICEF) and an IO should be permanent positions. Currently there is only one IO in the cluster; this could be integrated into non-UN positions to ensure turnover in time.	
10	Increase clearer accountability across ~~the~~ all GWC structures	CLA/CAST/SAG/GWC	There is informal accountability that runs through the GWC. Examples include the institution of a SAG, quarterly reports to the GWC and the Annual Partners Meeting. There are however examples which suggest a broader approach to accountability across all structures would be beneficial on many levels. Eg there is a sense that likely much discussion goes on within the SAG which benefit from greater involvement of the wider GWC partnership; specific contributions of Unicef to the GWC. Greater transparency through ~~and openness~~, instituting clearer accountability throughout GWC structures – from the CLA to the broader partnership and vice versa, including to the field, could support a sense of inclusion and a voice for all. ~~An~~ examples of potential ~~cluster~~ accountability mechanisms between different stakeholders and structures, in the form of an Accountability ~~f~~Framework, are proposed in ~~is shared~~ in Annex 3. Accountability only truly works if there are mechanisms to monitor and feedback on whether there is a sense that accountability is being met, and agreed means by which to constructively engage to correct, when things are not working well.	
13	There is no appetite for introducing a co-lead arrangement	CAST/ SAG	Co-lead arrangements for clusters take up huge amounts of time and energy. In consultations with GWC partners, there was no specific interest or sense that a co-lead arrangement would improve the GWC's ability to meet its objectives.	
11	Rotating co-chair ~~arrangements~~ for the GWC SAG	CLA/CAST/SAG	A lot of work is needed to move forward with the new GWC strategy. CAST could benefit from more support from a co-chair of the SAG to work with them and support ~~move things~~moving forward specific issues. The Sphere Project had a chairing arrangement whereby there was much more interaction between the Sphere Project	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			Manager and the Chair of the Sphere Board, who acted as a sounding board and gave specific guidance and practical support in moving the strategy forward. The co-chair in the same vein could support in acting as a sounding board on arising issues and galvanising other members of the SAG and GWC in concrete support to the GWC strategy or representing the SAG/Cluster at specific times. and involving other members of the GWC. This role could rotate every six months given the intensive interaction.	
12	Ensure key WASH organizations are at the table	CAST/SAG	A mapping of the size of WASH humanitarian programming by different organizations was done using FTS data, 2016 and a five-year mapping (Annex 4), to identify the largest programming WASH organizations and ensure those potentially most influencial across the sector are involved. A number of organizations were found in the top 5, 10 and 20 who have not been involved with the GWC so far – in particular IOM, DRC and GiZ. IOM and DRC are interested to discuss greater involvement further although contact with GiZ was more challenging and requires further follow-up.	
13	Consider carefully membership criteria to ensure the approach is inclusive	CAST/SAG	Most GWC partners are not aware of their specific membership status and there was not much appetite for spending a lot of time to discuss this; ensuring those who don't meet a high level of criteria are not alienated. Consider a more 'operational' titles for 'full members' e.g. Core Operational Partners.	
14	Work with UNHCR to review how GWC resources can be used to support all types of WASH responses	CLA/UNHCR/ CAST/	In the past, the GWC, through the RRT, supported refugee operations in Liberia. UNHCR is interested to talk through the viability of resources being shared for all WASH responses. Some challenges had been found through such previous deployments and therefore it's important that this be discussed at an agency level to reduce confusion and for a more sustained approach.	
15	a. Review purpose of GWC meetings and take a more consciously strategic approach to (annual) partner meetings	CAST/SAG	a. Given the change over time of the scope and size of the GWC partner meetings, it is a good moment to cConsider a clearer more explicit review of what's needed from strategic approach to partner meetings to ensure that their overall purpose is clear and agreed and then well organised to meet these strategic aimsobjectives, as well as ensuringe partners find them useful beyond the networking opportunities they produce (listed as the main use of the annual meeting). There are however attempts by CAST to engage the membership through pre-meeting surveys and SAG input, it seems that this is not producing the appropriate outcome.	
	b. Consider a separate		b. Given that participation is now very large in GWC meetings, there is little space for key operational agencies	

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
'operational' agencies meeting mid-year		(core members) to come together – how can this space be built-in? Would a separate mid-year, perhaps Europe-based meeting be helpful to support an operations meeting, complemented by the proposal for more regular operations teleconferences on key emergency responses.	
c. Consider independent professional facilitators for GWC meetings		Other clusters use independent professional facilitators to assist in the design and running of the cluster meetings to ensure planned results are achieved. Such facilitation support would also allow CAST to more fully participate in meetings	

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Increasing the Operational Relevance of the GWC and Strategic Approaches to Increasing 'An Effective, Quality, Comprehensive WASH Response for those Affected by Crisis'

78. This sections deals with those bigger strategic issues that need to be addressed to have an impact on an effective WASH response. For some time, the GWC has focused on coordination needs and this has been, and continues to be, critical in supporting an effective response. However, there are other issues which need support in order to move the sector forward.

79. As highlighted in the earlier chapter on Ppartnerships, in order to be able to scale up and cover the scope of work that needs to be done, there needs to be confidence and trust to allow others to take medium to longer-term leadership roles.the GWC needs to review if the maturity of the partnership is such that it feels comfortable to support leadership by individual or groups of organisations, on specific issues to improve WASH sector response which has happened within other sectors (Nutrition, Food Security).

Recommendations

| Important and Urgent | 🟥 | Important | 🟨 | Quick Win | 🟦 |

Those indicated in blue as quick-wins does not indicate necessarily a lower important, they may just be more simple to implement, but have significant impact

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
16	Global WASH Cluster to A be more ambitious advocacy agenda and diverse in its approach to to increaseing its goal of effective and quality responses for those affected by crisis	CLA/CAST/ SAG/GWC/ WASH-PD	Other sectors have aimed higher when it comes to increasing the profile and funding of their sector, including in emergencies. The WASH Sector on the development side has also been more ambitious and successful in launching such initiatives. Other sectors have also launched advocacy and fundraising initiatives such as the recent 'Education Cannot Wait' (raising $87m at its launch), from which the Education Cluster will benefit; Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) Alliance; The Grand Bargain (of the WHS), which donors are already including within their funding decisions (e.g. ECHO). No one questioned however could remember a specific inter-agency humanitarian WASH initiative that had taken place, although there have been a number of individual agency initiatives eg Nutrition and WASH (ACF). Whilst it is not necessary for the GWC to run a campaign, it could play an instrumental facilitative role in bringing interested agencies together who may take it forward. There is demand from GWC Partners for this broader approach, the push in the past has been to remain	🟥

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			focused on coordination and perhaps demands further reflection of the origins of the cluster approach which was increase the effectiveness, quality and predictability of humanitarian response. Whilst coordination is critical, achieving increased quality and effective responses goes beyond providing coordination support.	
			Opportunities: UNICEF's WASH Programme Division is approaching their Communications Department regarding a launch of an initiative on WASH in emergencies and there may be an opportunity to make this a broader-than-UNICEF initiative and include the GWC and its members.	
17	Improving accountability to affected people through a Ffocusing on quality and effectiveness of of WASH response programming – a means to improve accountability to affected people	GWC/CAST	The objective of *real* accountability to affected communities is the best response possible. For this to happen, a number of things need to come together including access, funding and appropriately trained staff. Responses are largely *self-reported*, quality is *self-monitored* and overall achievement of sector objectives is little developed. Given that there is poor knowledge management overall within the WASH sector, repeating of mistakes and often low capacity of staff, it makes sense for the sector to come together to share its experiences and expertise to improve the overall quality of response. Technical Working Groups at field level take this approach, but stop short of reviewing implementation or adherence. Monitoring quality of sector implementation can be carried out in a safe, supportive environment and can be an empowering process for both agencies (potentially government) and communities, but importantly, it should result in an improved response. Examples from CAR have shown that peer monitoring, resulting in action plans and follow-up, have improved WASH results for communities affected by crises. Other examples to further trial and learn from include: - GWC-led monitoring support missions to review effectiveness and quality of key responses with a view to support improvements and build global learning. It was also suggested that at times it could be useful to include members of the *private sector*[16] to review alternative approaches to responses. - Independent monitoring teams – neutral dedicated teams.	

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[16] For example, people in the private sector with utilities, town/city WASH experience or specific technical specialists - they may think of different approaches to solve WASH response challenges which could be helpful

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			Guidance on these processes and facilitated trials should be implemented more widely to demonstrate results, develop guidance and gain sector-wide support. The days of agency-only monitoring are not compatible with a real commitment to accountability to affected people. Taking this further demonstrates maturity and trust within the partnership.	
21	Develop evidence based data and information to support increased advocacy for the Emergency WASH Sector, learning from other sectors and organisations, to raise campaigns to increase profile and funding to meet sector objectives	CLA/CAST/ SAG/GWC	*Data and evidence* is critical for any advocacy, campaign or mobilising additional resources for the sector. Examples where regular data collection and been critical to informing advocacy includes: UNICEF's flagship 'The State of the World's Children' report; Global Nutrition Report; FEWS NET multi-country famine early warning data and analysis. The Global Shelter Cluster is also commissioning a 'The State of the World's Shelter' report in 2017. However, no such publication exists for emergency WASH responses. Using data from FTS in 2009, the WASH cluster saw that it received less than 4 percent of all reported funding and appeals are largely funded around 40 percent. Reviewing data from the last 16 years (Annex 5), whilst absolute figures have increased, the situation is no different. WASH funding is also consistently 15–20 percent behind the average funding for all sectors[17]. What is the impact of this? Other life-saving sectors are faring better in terms of funding eg Food consistently 10-20 percent above the average and Heath increasing since the introduction of the cluster approach and consistently better than WASH in the last eight years (Financial Tracking System). As a percentage of all funding, Health has increased its share to an average of more than 12 percent in the last seven years and Food remains the highest individual sector with an average of more than 30 percent (Annex 5). *Opportunities:* Initial discussions with the Joint Monitoring Project (of the MDGs/SDGs) showed that while there were no specific publications on the '*State of the World's Access to WASH in Emergencies',* there is initial work that could be done to review existing data and to work together on a joint publication on WASH in complex humanitarian settings. Perhaps the assessment capacity that CDC is interested to support the GWC with could also support this work, as well as IM FST members who could join forces in supporting JMP to review existing data and potentially other parts of Unicef. There are also	

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[17] Of funds that are demanded through HRPs/Flash Appeals

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			opportunities for JMP and the Sphere revision to review where there might be opportunities for shared indicators, or at least common definitions[18].	
			Opportunities: Engage with the Food Security and Nutrition sectors, including FEWSNET, to review opportunities to integrate or access already-collected WASH-related data.	
~~18~~	Support cluster/sector coordinators prioritise operational coordination through ~~evidence-based~~country level research	CLA/GWC and other clusters	All cluster coordinators (not just WASH) talk of 'feeding the beast', of drowning in bureaucracy and demands and justifications for strategic plans and funding requests within HRPs and Flash Appeals (despite an additional 100% of funding being made outside of these appeals), which takes them away from operational coordination of the sector – exactly what the Transformative Agenda was meant to streamline and simplify.	
			~~Evidence~~ Initial research and evidence is needed to show ~~on~~ the effectiveness of processes and products demanded of them from the Humanitarian Programme Cycle to identify strengths and weaknesses. For greater advocacy purposes, it's likely it is important to work together with other clusters.	
			Given that this is specifically regarding the demands of the TA, relating directly to the effectiveness of humanitarian response, the cluster(s) could approach the IASC's Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) to support such an evidence gathering exercise.	
			With some initial evidence which would identify specific issues, the CLS and Emergency Directors of NGO partners, ~~of the clusters~~ could also advocate for such a wider review through the IASC Emergency Directors Group.	
~~19~~	Strengthen linkages with the Development WASH Sector – sustaining impacts of WASH humanitarian response at country level	CLA/CAST/ SAG/GWC/ WASH-PD	In many protracted humanitarian crises, the WASH situation is often weak due to chronic underdevelopment. WASH interventions with aims of 'sustainability' often have good intentions but rarely reach the mark.	
			By linking humanitarian investments with longer-term development initiatives, there are opportunities to increase the efficiency and effectiveness through 'investment protection', extending the impacts of short-term interventions through working more longer term on management of facilities and continuing low-cost hygiene promotion action. UN Habitat were interested in pursuing	

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[18] Connections with the Sphere WASH review authors and JMP have now been made

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			and testing this model and were confident that funding could be found for such a joint venture.	
			Decision-making on how limited humanitarian resources (eg pooled funds that clusters are specifically involved in developing strategies for their use, or advocacy with donors) could be most effectively and efficiently used should be influenced by how the development sector responds or restarts. Country clusters, supported encouraged by the GWC, can play a critical linkage with the development sector (often humanitarian response agencies are also part of these groups) to influence these decisions; such in-country discussions are therefore critical and need to be encouraged and learning shared.	
			Stronger links with WASH development coordination platforms could also potentially influence the use of development funding to contribute to humanitarian objectives. Collaboration is also critical to ensure that the humanitarian organizations' ways of working cause limited disruption to development programming .	
			Given the number of people affected long term by crises, it is important to ensure that in measuring SDGs, special attention is given to those in protracted crises; the JMP is open to explore these possibilities as previously noted.	
			The GWC outreach to Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) is a useful first step in what needs to be a more fully-rounded strategy; a meeting on how to act on these recommendations needs to be set.	
			The ODI report[19] on how the humanitarian and development WASH sectors can work better together also provides useful recommendations on how they should move forward, particularly related to breaking down the barriers of different funding mechanisms.	
20	Develop case studies of integrated (multi-cluster) approaches to multi-dimensional issues	CAST/Global Cluster Coordinators /GWC	The Transformative Agenda introduced Strategic Response Plans, which then became 'Humanitarian Response Plans'. A key aspect of the SRP/HRPs was that plans for strategic objectives should be developed on a multi-sectoral basis. However, the reality is that the siloed approach continues with few real integrated approaches – in very very few (if any) locations do we know if multiple responses are received by the same community/families; multiple responses that are meant to produce a greater sum of its parts. It is unclear to many what integrated programming should look like. The GWC should engage with other	

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[19] Making humanitarian and development WASH work better together, 2016

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			relevant clusters to develop case studies and examples of what integrated programming should look like, to assist WASH sectors at country level, e.g. strategies for under-nutrition, urban settlement approaches, cholera.	
21	~~Work with UNHCR to review how GWC resources can be used to support all types of WASH responses~~	~~CLA/UNHCR/ CAST/~~	~~In the past, the GWC, through the RRT, supported refugee operations in Liberia. UNHCR is interested to talk through the viability of resources being shared for all WASH responses. It's important that this be discussed at an agency level for a more sustained approach.~~	
~~22~~	Building an 'Evidence-to-Implementation' Road Map	CAST/WASH-PD/GWC/ Academics	The management of the full circle of evidence to change is in most cases not considered and the loop is rarely closed. The full circle includes: a. Identifying evidence gaps. b. Research to develop evidence. c. Wide dissemination of results evidence – 'translated' into digestible practical field briefs. d. Agreement by the sector/agencies/GWC to make changes to response policy. e. Policy changes internally to agencies based on evidence and promoted and implemented at field level f. Operationalization of policy changes within and widely across organizations. Whilst there have been attempts to fill gaps with research publication, there are missing links between these, agreeing sector policy changes and implementing these in emergency response. Gaps in evidence for WASH response have been highlighted on numerous occasions (and mapped), although no specific overall plan has been put in place regarding how to address this. Many of the gaps mapped also include aspects of WASH for which there has been much work already done. Is it that the information is not widely known about or are they real gaps? ELRHA R2H2 funding reported that the reason why WASH projects do not get research funding is because of issues with methodology, which, with collaboration with academic institutions, could be addressed. There are also opportunities to work with DfID's Humanitarian Adviser for WASH to promote research funding going to WASH projects. Academics also report that a 'who's doing what, where' for evidence research for WASH is not known, although LSHTM is currently doing some mapping. The development of a strategy and 'road-map' for how evidence gaps should be filled and prioritised and how new evidence changes WASH responses at country level, would likely benefit from broader involvement of WASH	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			agencies. The GWC can be a catalyst to bring together stakeholders, particularly academics and including WASH sector journal editors, to develop this 'road map'. There seem to be many opportunities for funding of operational research to fill these evidence gaps (including through a number of rapid response research funds that can be drawn upon). Academics however often report bottle-necks in finding WASH response agencies to partner with. The GWC could facilitate removing this bottleneck through the same process.	
23	Develop and Implement a Knowledge Management (KM) Strategy for the WASH sector, starting with quick wins	CAST/SAG/ GWC/ Academics/ Other Experts	Most interviewers who are field-based or regularly in the field talked of repeated mistakes and reinventing the wheel. WASH field staff are not aware of technical materials available but (IEC) materials developed in-country for a specific response seem to disappear and no one is aware of them at the next response (eg Haiti 2016). There have been some efforts by the GWC in the past which have yet to come to anything and UNHCR has recently worked on WASH KM. Other sites that people refer to include watersanitationhygiene.org, but nothing yet comprehensively covers the depth of WASH work available. It's important to work with groups and institutions to develop the strategy, and look to those who have the ability to take on the WASH sector knowledge management in the long term – academic institutions are obviously well placed. There is also potential opportunity to develop this work as research/PhD project (as ACF often does in its research), of which there are already candidates. WEDC also offers to store paper and holds an extensive list of WASH titles. Quick wins are also necessary to be able to demonstrate to the WASH community that this is going in the right direction. Consultation with the field is essential in order to understand how they would like to access WASH knowledge.	
24	Review and develop effective strategies to support WASH assessments to improve decision-making and WASH response	CAST/GWC/ Academics	Evidence-based operational decision-making through assessments, monitoring and information management remains elusive to the WASH sector. Assessments are deemed 'under-thought' (by the right people) and often 'overworked' (largely by technicians rather than analysts). Time is often spent on data and information gathering (often without being clear what decisions will be made using the data), and much less on analysis and decision making. WASH field staff cited several examples of how a lack of evidence to back up WASH strategies and responses impacts on ability to fundraise; they often look with envy at the Food Security, Nutrition and Health sectors, which seem to be much better positioned.	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			Commitment to real change here requires bringing a range of experts together to assess what the impact is of poor assessments/monitoring, and find a new way to assess, analyse and monitor the sector. This includes reviewing how expertise is provided to support the field, with the FST assessment capacity currently not highly in demand. It would be useful to look at potential linkages between this work and recommended efforts to monitor better the state of WASH in emergencies in protracted crises. *Opportunities:* CDC is keen to support the development of the area of WASH assessments/surveys. *Opportunities:* ACAPS is keen to work with the WASH cluster, particularly to review how better analysis of existing data can support a better evidence base for responses. There could be opportunities to work with and deploy their analysts (potentially through the NRC-managed assessment roster), to illustrate how better analysis can improve sector evidence.	
25	Progress to decisions on how to move forward on the Urban WASH agenda	CAST/GWC/ WASH-PD/ IRC-UN Habitat	For several years, WASH in urban settings has been high on the agenda to address, but has been unable to move forward. There is clear recognition of the need to do more for appropriate responses but few interviewed had a sense of what they wanted the GWC to do to take this further; there were some who had clearer ideas around developing multi-sectoral settlement approaches, municipal-type coordination approaches and higher-level engagement with the private sector. Others talked of the recognition that whilst some settings might be rural, the number of people concentrated in small areas resemble more medium and large-sized town populations and therefore required a different approach. With more emergency responses in urban and peri-urban settings, there is a need for the WASH sector to transform to remain relevant. There are many initiatives and platforms which bring cities and municipalities together during emergencies, most of which feel somewhat large and overwhelming for most partners in the GWC. Several organizations individually have relationships with parts of the WASH private sector and there have been initiatives by RedR in the UK to bring private sector companies together through their Ready to Respond project and The Hub[20]. What seems clear from the evidence and interviews is that in the long term, taking a fully pro bono approach is not sustainable. ICRC is the WASH organization with the most experience in supporting towns and cities with an urban approach and their annual budget (estimated $250m̶k̶)̶ is reflective	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			of that. Their profile and expertise of staff draws particularly on the private sector and they have been developing their expertise in urban WASH for more than 20 years and recognise the challenges for other humanitarian organisations not as experienced, to respond in the urban environment. The Shelter Cluster and IMPACT (also part of the GWC) are also developing the 'settlement approach' which is focused around humanitarian action in urban centres. IRC and UNHabitat launched the Global Alliance for Urban Crises at the World Humanitarian Summit. With both agencies linked to the GWC (although less active recently), there may be opportunities for the theseroo organizations to assist in facilitating discussions to takeing Urban WASH forward, identifying its specific limits.	
26	Monitoring the impact of Cash on WASH Objectives	CAST/SAG/ Cash WG	Few would deny the positive move towards Cash as a more appropriate and accountable mechanism to support greater choice and decision making over how family and individual needs are met. There are some concerns, however, that Cash may not always achieve the objectives and desired outcomes of WASH programming, whilst funds previously directed at sector programming will no longer be available. Along with promoting guidance and case studies of the potential and positive use of Cash, the GWC should work to develop monitoring of the impact of Cash (particularly multi-sectoral unconditional Cash), to ensure that WASH outcomes are being reached. The recommendation in the Coordination Capacity/FST section to bring in a Cash expert to the FST should work with monitoring, Cash and WASH experts to develop and implement such monitoring.	
27	Develop a Grand Bargain strategy and use it as a mechanism to access dedicated resources	CLA/CAST/ SAG	The Grand Bargain[21] offers ten strategies to improve the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian response. Whilst there are some more 'agency' specific agreements, there are several key components which meet with some of the strategic work of the GWC. There are also some relevant agreements for which the GWC is yet to discuss, e.g. more support and funding tools for local and national responders – if within 3 years, 25 percent of funding should go as directly as possible to national responders, then specific strategies will be needed at country level to support local responders with the capacity to apply these funds effectively. Donors are also providing specific support for the Grand Bargain, and this represents an opportunity for the GWC.	

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[21] Grand Bargain, May 2016

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
~~28~~	Regular monitoring of the funding of WASH in emergencies, and research to review the impact of underfunding	CAST	As noted, the WASH sector has received less than 4 percent of reported funding to FTS over the last 16 years and is usually funded less than 40 percent of the appeal request. In an analysis of funding of the Nigeria HRP, coordination services were funded more than WASH and Health put together (Annex 5), with WASH funded at only 15%. There are, however, often funds allocated to responses outside of the HRP. The importance of this and the relevance of external projects outside of the appeal is not well understood. In general, the trend for the last 10 years has been for 50 percent of all funding to be directed outside of appeals (Annex 6). For example, in 2016, 40 percent of funding to WASH was directed to projects outside of the appeal (Annex 7). If all WASH funding had been directed to ~~the~~ appeals, this would have resulted in a 66 percent achievement of the appeal needs, ~~not 40 percent.~~ In the Nigeria example, we see that whilst WASH is funded to 15% against the appeal of $48m, we see that more than $21m (45 percent of the appeal value) has been given to ICRC whose funds are usually reported, but they are not part of the appeal. It's difficult therefore to understand the impact of this external funding, without further analysis at country level. If all funds donated in 2016 had been directed to appeals, this would have resulted in an overall attainment of 115 percent[22] ~~(2016 total appeal request US$19.8 billion, total received, including not against appeals US$22.9 billion)~~, ~~but we rarely see these figures together.~~ ~~, nor do we understand~~ It's challenging to understand if ~~the real implications of whether~~ priorities identified by the majority of sector actors ~~y needs~~ are being funded, nor ~~,~~ whether the capacity of the WASH sector is such that it can scale up its response. Country clusters should be supported to develop sector overviews which give an informed indication of needs, response and capacity. It could be interesting to review the Shelter Cluster quarterly Country Factsheets that it produces with its country coordinators to do just that. Funding levels and the reasons for and impact of underfunding is of interest to most operational agencies. Analysis of underfunding, its reasons and impact would therefore benefit from an inter-agency approach.	

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[22] 2016 total appeal requests US$19.8 billion, total received, including not against appeals US$22.9 billion

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			The business case for WASH is strong although sector representatives could perhaps be more effective communicators/advocates in presenting and defending this business case to the greatest effect. Short communications and advocacy papers presenting the evidence[23] could be helpful in assisting the WASH sector advocate for a bigger proportion of funds as well as ensuring that WASH is equally funded in situations of for example, acute nutrition problems; an integrated response is promoted, but this is not always borne out in donor funding.	
			If the GWC is to be involved in greater advocacy for resources, it needs to research and understand the impact of the apparent underfunding on those affected by crises. Does the sector have the capacity to do more, and what would it take to scale-up further?	
			A mid-year review of funding by CAST and Country clusters, identifying countries where the greatest assistance is needed and engaging a donors support group withand key operational partners to review these could be a way forward.	
29	Develop and Implement an Operational Learning Strategy	CAST/SAG/ GWC	Linked to the issue of quality is that of learning. It was cited on numerous occasions that there are many opportunities for operational learning that are not taken up. For example, there were questions on whether opportunities for gathering lessons post-ebola have been taken effectively.	
			Specific themes could be identified to gather lessons and (linked to ensure the circle of evidence implementation and a broader information management strategy), devise strategies to disseminate and influence future emergencies.	
			The Logs Cluster systematically includes a peer learning review as part of its coordination package for each emergency. Similar peer reviews could be implemented by the GWC partners (including regional bodies and potentially the private sector), with support for write-up, at very little cost.	

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[23] Communications pieces to assist WASH Cluster coordinators and WASH agencies effectively communicate the business case for WASH using data/evidence where it exists, to back this up. Eg – health impact, impact on nutrition, ARIs, protection, dignity etc. Not everyone is aware of the support WASH data and evidence. This would support WASH staff and their managers (who are often advocating for funds) in writing proposals or presenting its case to the cluster defence panel.

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			The FST provides opportunities to gather field lessons, although many FST members[24] cited limited opportunities to apply their learning, from deployments to GWC work.	
			The Food Security Cluster is using the results of the Cluster Coordination Performance Monitoring[25] to influence its strategy for the next five years. The GWC is not currently systematically utilising the performance monitoring data of WASH clusters at country level to gather learning from across countries to influence its work. Given the large number of cluster and 'cluster-like' countries supported, a prioritisation of those that would receive specific CAST support needs to be done.	
			The decision to go down a different route/tool from many of the other clusters should perhaps be reviewed with UNICEF's Inter-Cluster Information Management Unit.	
30	Develop further relationships with theExplore the relevance of the GWC in fostering relationships with private sector at country and global levels	CAST/GWC	Discussions with GWC partners did not allow a clear articulation of what is wanted from engagement from the Private Sector and therefore it is difficult to provide strong recommendations in one particular direction. Different agencies have different boundaries for cooperation with the private sector and this also needs to be taken into account regarding the role that the GWC has in engaging the Private Sector.	

			Partnerships with the private sector were mentioned in several can come in many forms, for example:
			    a. A problem solver.
			    b. Technology developer/supplier.
			    c. Provider of technical expertise (particularly in urban settings).
			    d. A conduit for raising funds.
			    e. Pro bono work to support WASH sector (e.g. communications).	

			A further discussion with the GWC partners is needed to understand if there is a specific direction that they would like CAST to support, or whether guidance to support country clusters identify how to engage the private sector, particularly in natural disasters is more relevant (mentioned later under this recommendation.	
			Most relationships in the WASH sector have been developed by individual agencies rather than by networks or globally. Even the standby partnerships which have the potential to support the sector more broadly with DSS (Netherlands Water Partnerships through Dutch Surge Support) and Veolia were partnerships developed by UNICEF. There may be potential to tap into the World Bank[26]-IWA Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility	

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[24] Survey of Past and Present Members

[25] A tool/process agreed to be implemented by the Global Clusters

[26] Despite best efforts, it was not possible to interview the contact person from the World Bank.

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
		(PPIAF) and other public-private initiatives for more emergency-related needs.	
		The access to private sector WASH urban experts is not well-known. ~~The relationship with Veolia, which was previously well developed with the GWC, is now weak with no recent deployments to UNICEF which could be followed up on.~~ There may be opportunity to disseminate this further, particularly during proposed emergency teleconferences between the GWC and country-level clusters, or to make a specific brochure on technical assistance which could be disseminated at country level.	
		In the past there have been relationships and meetings with suppliers where there has been a sharing of experiences of challenges where new designs and technology are discussed and demonstrated. These are much less common (perhaps because there are less technical challenges), but there is a sense from some of these stakeholders that they are not always kept informed of trends and needs in order to provide solutions to unmet needs; there is a need to build trust and mutual respect.	
		Fundraising through micro-payments through companies of water utilities largely tend to have a focus on organizations based in their country of origin, such as WaterAid, although there may be some room for discussion with international associations such as AquaFed or IWA.	
		To take any fundraising potential forward with the private sector, it is important that UNICEF's Private Sector Partnerships division is involved to ensure coordinated approaches.	
		Experience shows that such longer-term partnerships take a lot of investment in time and over sustained periods; the private sector often wants to have a greater involvement beyond funding.	
		When there are large emergencies, there is often a lot of outreach from the private sector to see how they can support, including goods-in-kind. It may be useful to have a publication that can be developed by the GWC, OCHA and UNICEF's Private Sector Partnerships to guide giving, and an opportunity to indicate useful (and not useful) ways of assisting.	
		OCHA's Private Sector Section in Geneva has links to many private sector networks and is willing to guide and potentially support the GWC.	

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
		At country level there are opportunities for greater partnerships with the private sector. The earthquake in Nepal in 2015 illustrated the huge potential for public-private sector partnerships, if guided well. It was proposed in the recommendations covering monitoring and learning that it could also be useful to have representation of the private sector in monitoring or operational learning review teams combining different views of effective ways of achieving results for affected people.	
		There may be opportunities to further understand the potential linkages with the private sector for WASH in emergencies through a series of joint country-level reviews, exploring what potential is untapped at country level and informing the direction of any global support. OCHA's regional office in Bangkok has been working on private sector engagement and may be a source of information when engaging on this.	

Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) and Cluster Advocacy and Support Team (CAST) – Integration, Rightsizing and Optimising CAST to Facilitate and Support the GWC to Meet its Objectives

80. CAST has been in operation since the first strategy was put in place in 2006, representing then the GCC and the WASH Cluster Manager. The GCC, based then at UNICEF in New York, followed the strategic and internal aspects of uptake of the cluster approach, many of the donor relations and links to UNICEF Country Reps, whilst the WASH Cluster Manager followed the implementation of the cluster strategy, partnerships, work plan, projects, RRT and budget monitoring.

81. The recommendations here recognises the scale and scope of work that needs to be done in the global WASH Cluster and the need to expand and find reformulation of CAST towards a 'Global Support Team' to allow a greater focus on strategic issues by the GCC, and streamlininged responsibilities whilst maintaining operational support. The current two-person team approach needs to become more inclusive to reflect the additional global support capacity from the FSTand FST manager.

82. At the same time, greater leverage and resources can be gained for the GWC by a much closer working relationship internally within UNICEF – particularly with WASH-PD, EMOPs, communications and fundraising. The CLA representative linkage to the GWC would certainly benefit from strengthening to ensure an integration and a depth of understanding of the partnership and progress in meeting its objectives.

83. Many other recommendations are proposed for the CLA and CAST throughout the report; recommendations in this chapter focus in on internal changes.

Recommendations

Important and Urgent	🟥	Important	🟨	Quick Win	🟦

Those indicated in blue as quick-wins does not indicate necessarily a lower important, they may just be more simple to implement, but have significant impact

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
34.	CLA discussion to review it roles and responsibilities and which part of the organisation is best placed to support this.	CLA with relevant regional and global divisions and sections	In the past, there was a greater division of labour of CLA responsibilities at both global and regional level. With the move to EMOPS, CAST (and likely most Unicef led Clusters) have become more isolated and have ended trying to fill gaps previously taken up across several sections, globally and regionally which is neither sustainable nor realistic in terms of meeting all needs. Whilst CAST (and all Unicef Global Cluster Coordinators) have a role to play in funding, the support role of Unicef's fund raising division also requires clarification.	🟥

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
31.3	Improve communication on the commitments that UNICEF makes to its CLA role for WASH and the value that it puts on the partnerships in WASH	CLA/CAST	UNICEF has made good progress in its CLA role, particularly where it comes to staffing commitments in protracted crisis, although this had not been mapped and therefore little understood by partners. GWC meetings have not often recently included presence of senior management. In supporting an increased depth of collaboration, increased communication of these commitments and the value of partnerships would contribute to a better understanding within the GWC partnership.	
32.3	The work of the GWC needs to be better understood and integrated into other areas of UNICEF's work to gain greater leverage.	CAST/CLA	The CLA is felt to be somewhat on the edge of the work of the GWC and likely across all UNICEF clusters. Conversely, CAST is also somewhat on the edge of internal UNICEF programmes and procedures. Both make advocacy in key parts of the organization problematic, and access to resources which are only accessible through internal means more challenging, e.g. block grants given by government donors for UNICEF's emergency work broadly as well as WASH-specific funding. Prior to the move from Programme Division to EMOPS, CAST functions were shared between Geneva (residing in EMOPs) and the WASH Section of Programme Division (PD) in New York. With the full move of all CAST functions to EMOPs in Geneva (along with other UNICEF Clusters), the strong link with other divisions in New York and that of the WASH Section in PD has been significantly reduced. Increased linkages between UNICEF's WASH Section/PD and its Regional (Emergency) WASH Advisers are an important step to agreeing where capacity and support is best placed to gain a recognition of split responsibilities amongst different parts of the CLA, and also a more appropriate division of labour on long-term coordination support needs eg work on capacity building of national coordination platforms, which requires longer term support to countries which are often not the focus of the GWC (those which meet pre-requirements for national capacity and engagement, largely countries affected by natural disasters, rather than those in protracted complex disasters).	
33.3	Clarify the role of UNICEF's regional offices in the support of country clusters and cluster coordination staff	CLA (multi-division) lead by EMOPS, supported by Global Cluster Coord Unit (GCCU)	In the past, UNICEF's Regional WASH Advisers took on a greater role in the support to in-country clusters and coordination teams. With the position of the RECAs introduced, this effectively transferred the responsibility of support to in-country clusters to the RECA positions. When these positions closed down initially, it was understood that funds would come to replace them and so no handover of responsibilities was implemented. Most of the regional advisers said there was no organizational obligation to support clusters, with most focusing on the UNICEF programme support	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			As a result, much more support of these in-country clusters is being carried out by CAST than the Regional Advisers as previously. The CLARE report noted that there was a lack of clarity of the role of the regional offices (whilst cluster approach guidance for COs has now been developed) and recommended this be clarified. It is understood that some discussions on the regional role have taken place, although nothing formally put in writing; Regional WASH Advisers are not aware of guidance. Clarification and a greater role of the Regional WASH Advisers would free up more time for CAST to focus on more strategic issues.	
34.3	Find a home in UNICEF for information management to improve its integration into internal products, processes and support	CLA (multi-divisions) lead by EMOPS, UNICEF Cluster Coordinators	Currently there is little support for Information Managers (in all UNICEF clusters) as these position titles do not exist outside of cluster coordination roles. There is also no specific expertise within CAST in IM to support the FST. In the past there had been linkages with the M&E functions of UNICEF. In order to integrate and sustain the role, products and support of information managers, there are potentially opportunities to explore this further, working with the Inter-cluster Information Manager within EMOPs. There may be additional opportunities and options to get further support for IM officers, for example: – Explore how data and information management is supported within the WASH Section of PD in NY. – Work with the Global Inter-Cluster Coordination Unit and the Inter-Cluster Information Manager to review how IM and IMOs can be better supported within the clusters. IMOs indicated some very good interactions via the Inter-Cluster IM organised training/review (Amman) organised by UNICEF's Inter-Cluster Information Manager and would like to see more of these sorts of initiatives.	
35.3	Within the framework of greater shared responsibility for the Global Cluster Coordination Lead Agency rRole with UNICEF's WASH- PD Section (and other divisions), review the opportunity to have senior coordination support role to be based in WASH-PD in New York	WASH-PD/ CAST/ EMOPs	A senior coordination support position in WASH-PD would not only increase capacity *within* UNICEF for L3 coordination and coordination capacity generally, but this would build bridges of work between Global WASH Cluster work in EMOPs Geneva (where all UNICEF Global Cluster Coordinators and CAST are located) and UNICEF's WASH Section in Programme Division. This position could also work on developing internal UNICEF capacity to support coordination, including more support to many staff playing a double-hatting role. It would allow senior capacity to support transition and preparedness activities, as well as more broadly supporting the project to build capacity of national humanitarian coordination platforms.	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
~~36.~~4	Consider a broader approach to ~~global~~ support provided by the GWC (CAST, FST) to expand capacity and to support increased levels of strategic work, creating a Global Support Team, moving away from CAST	CLA/CAST/ FST Consortium Lead and Participating Agencies	CAST consists of two positions – the GCC and the deputy. Other clusters eg Food Security, Shelter, Logistics have taken a broader approach to their support teams, creating a broader approach to global support teams as well as increased capacity at global level.	
			Reviewing the structure of other global clusters (Annex 8), most have an extended Global Support Team, with a greater number of positions funded directly by the CLA through consultancies, SBPs (more in the past) as well as in-kind contributions by other partners of the cluster. Alternative contracting through UNOPS and other agencies has also been an approach, although still funded through the CLA.	
			Several Global Support Teams of the global clusters incorporate the rapid response into their mandate, with up to 40 percent deployment. The approach sees rapid response teams as an integral part of the global support team, but with specific areas of responsibility in non-deployment time, rather than seen as an 'add-on'. This approach is critical in getting the best from the FST members; a name change, to something which reflects the wider team approach, seems important eg Global Support Team.	
			This alternate approach of reduced deployment rates would not need to be implemented across all of the current FST members, but perhaps could be *one of the models* that would make up capacity of CAST (Global Support Team) and the FST (not necessarily NGO consortium members). More senior members would have this smaller percent of deployment (e.g. 40 percent) to focus in on GWC strategic issues or perhaps play a mentoring and support role to other members of the FST and other field coordination staff.	
			Reconsider the 60-20-20 split of the FST members. Neither the GWC nor the agencies themselves are able to effectively use this time and therefore a rethink on how the 40% of time is implemented is needed. Potentially the full 40% could be given to the GWC or to the agency (potentially with an agency contribution to salary costs)	
			Ideally the FST Manager would be an experienced senior-level coordinator who would provide direct management and support to the FST, and draw upon other resources such as the Inter-Cluster IM Unit, to provide more technical support for IMOs.	
			Both of these mechanisms would free up the GCC and Deputy GCC from operations, to further critical strategic aspects of the GWC strategy.	

	Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
			If the CAST does not find a way to broaden its approach and capacity (including critically ~~and as a minimum~~ to find alternate ways to provide substantial support for the FST), it is difficult to see how there will be space to progress on more strategic issues to improve the overall effectiveness and quality of response to affected people. An additional two full-time experienced staff for two to three year are needed to support the GWC in moving all of the comprehensive recommendations ahead, increase and accelerate partnerships; support expanded advocacy, increase operational engagement with GWC partners and operational learning; monitor the effectiveness of Cash responses in meeting WASH objectives; develop the FST and SBP capacity; potentially engage more with regional offices to take on the responsibility to support country clusters; and support the wider aspects of the GWC strategy.	
37.4	Greater clarity and optimisation needed of and between the roles and responsibilities of the Cluster Coordinator and Deputy – to gain efficiencies and improve effectiveness in achieving strategic and operational goals	CLA/CAST	There are several overlaps of responsibilities of the two positions and it is not always clear internally or externally who leads on which aspects of work. Whilst it might ideal to have both people involved in ~~all~~ most activities, the scale and diversity of work means that ~~this is somewhat of a luxury~~clearer differentiation of roles would support greater efficiency and optimisation. There is a need for clearly separated strategic and operational tasks, with a very streamlined involvement in the FST, with greater delegation of authority to the FST Manager and senior FST members.	
38.4	Review UNICEF internal WASH Coordinator and IM capacity and analyse the relative risk for UNICEF	CLA/CAST/ EMOPs/ WASH-PD	From 40[27] WASH coordination deployments (coordinator and IM), only one[28] (2.5 percent) came from internal resources. Is this an indication of relative internal capacity or a comfortable and confident reliance on the FST and SBPs to provide this capacity? The answer could be either or a mix, but their needs to be a recognition of the current situation and agree a way forward.	

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[27] UNICEF Global Cluster Coordination Unit Coordination Dashboard

[28] Data from UNICEF Emergency Surge, Human Resources

Quality, Effective, Predictable and Efficient Coordination Capacity

83. This chapter deals with all aspects of coordination capacity, including the GWC's Field Support Team (FST) and UNICEF's Standby Partners (SBPs), giving an overview of data and context in narrative, rather than in the recommendations tables as done in previous sections. Recommendations to support improvements in coordination capacity can be found at the end of the chapter.

Mechanisms by which Coordination is Supported

84. There are seven means by which coordination roles (coordinators and IM) are currently being supported at the country level (see tables below).

85. A review of FST and SBP deployments 2015–2016 was carried out (Annex 9). A point-in-time mapping of UNICEF coordination staff was also made in coordination with UNICEF Regional (Emergency) WASH Advisers (Annex 10). This mapping examined which staffing mechanisms were being used by UNICEF to fill these coordination roles. A comparison can be found in the tables below.

Mechanism	Deployments in 2016	Days
1. GWC Field Support Team (FST)	25	1,169
2. UNICEF Standby Partners (SBPs)	11	1,718
3. UNICEF internal redeployments (ERT, IRT, HSP, HSD)[29]	1	60
4. (a) Consultants – Dedicated (b) Consultants – Double-hatted	17 10	Not measured Not measured
5. UNICEF supported PCAs	Not measured	Not measured
6. Co-Lead/Facilitation, Sub-National by NGOs	Not measured	Not measured
7. (a) Dedicated UNICEF Temporary (TA) and Fixed-Term (FT) Staff – 23 National and 15 International[30]	38	Full time
(b) Double-Hatted UNICEF Temporary (TA) and Fixed-Term (FT) Staff – 44 National and 27 International	71	Part time

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[29] ERT – Emergency Response Team (senior dedicated full time team – 1 WASH Programme - *No WASH Sector/Coordination role included in team*);
IRT Immediate Response Team – trained existing staff for L3 responses - *No WASH Sector/Coordination role included in team (or any other sector coordination roles)*;
HSP – Humanitarian Support Personnel – consultants, P3 equivalent - *No WASH Sector/Coordination role included in team*;
HSD – Humanitarian Surge Deployment - redeployment
[30] See tables later in the chapter for detail. TA – Temporary Appointment for less than 1 year; FT – Fixed-Term Staff for 1 year or longer (full benefits)

86. The FST plays a critical role in ensuring UNICEF's CLA responsibilities at country level for rapid onset and short-term support. It is clear from data and interviews that the FST provides the most important first-line response. The FST also often plays a capacity-building support role for new UNICEF staff in-country (15% of deployments), particularly when temporary measures transition into longer-term staff roles, for which there are no other internal mechanisms and which would be much more difficult to do if consultants or similar were to be recruited. This is an important contribution to the effectiveness of coordination roles which would be difficult to manage through other types of resource.

87. The SBPs also play an important role, deploying more than 30% of coordination roles in 2016 (and up to 50% 2015-2016), sometimes deploying following FST deployments. The deployments are longer than those of the FST, with an average of 156 days in 2016, against 47 days average of the FST. . SBP rosters however currently have more capacity to support coordinator roles, than IM.

88. Given that there are no WASH coordination positions within UNICEF's internal specific rapid response mechanisms (ERT, IRT, HSPs), and only one internal redeployment to a WASH Coordinator role (and no Information Manager redeployments) in 2016, there is a certain reliance upon the FST in particular, as well as SBPs, for rapid response to support UNICEF's CLA coordination roles. Ensuring the continuity of the FST, or indeed taking alternative strategies to ensure rapid response for the WASH Cluster, is therefore critically important.

89. Interviews with those from UNICEF COs who have used the FST highlighted the benefits of rapidly receiving experienced professionals who could 'hit the ground running', all with minimum process from the CO (minimum process is prized more highly than minimum cost). The rapidity, quality of deployees (measured by experience and understanding of the role), ability to hit the ground running and understanding of how UNICEF works are qualities apparently not often found in those deployed for coordination roles from SBPs, meaning FST is particularly highly regarded. FST deployments have also been used to illustrate the benefits of coordination roles, with a resulting recruitment of staff positions.

90. Co-lead and sub-national coordination roles are often taken on by NGOs on a dedicated or part-time basis, both funded and unfunded. This data has never been analysed by the Global WASH Cluster, but a small dip into some of this data shows that there are indeed significant contributions to coordination which potentially could be more predictable, further expanded and maximised.

Commitment to the Longer-Term Need for Coordination Roles

91. The data, including details from the two tables below, also show that where an emergency becomes protracted, there is often a recognition by the UNICEF CO of the importance of the coordination role and the position becomes a staff position, although this is less common within information management. *Large protracted emergencies and L3 emergencies have dedicated coordinators (international) on UNICEF staff contracts and dedicated national coordinators also feature prominently*.

92. The number of staff is significant and illustrates the importance the CLA places on the sector coordination role as well as the expectations of the humanitarian and donor community.

93. Unicef also has a Fast-track procedure for recruitment of key posts for emergency responses which supported the recruitment of four cluster coordinator positions in 2016 (Yemen, Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan), and three in 2015 (DRC, South Sudan, Sudan).

93.94.   Given the large numbers of people playing a double-hatting role but that there has been limited WASH Cluster coordination training for UNICEF staff, it would be worth reviewing the need for additional support to capacity building.

Dedicated UNICEF Staff Roles

		Cluster Coordinator				IM		
		International	National	Total		International	National	Total
Staff	FT	9	7	16		0	6	6
	TA	4	7	11		2	3	5
Total Staff		13	14	27		2	9	11
Consultant		4	1	5		0	12	12
Total		17	15	32		2	21	23

Double-Hatted UNICEF Staff Roles

		Cluster Coordinator				IM		
		International	National	Total		International	National	Total
Staff	FT	20	34	54		1	3	4
	TA	6	7	13		0	1	1
Total Staff		26	41	67		1	4	5
Consultant		3	1	4		0	6	6
Total		29	42	71		1	10	11

Field Support Team (FST)

Sustaining a Predictable FST

94.95.   It is felt that with longer, more guaranteed, funding the GWC would be able to attract a higher calibre of candidates, have less change within the FST, less gaps in availability of FST members (which had a significant effect in 2015 and may have impacts in 2017), as well as reduced transactional costs. It also means that members will have more experience of working within UNICEF, as well as in the coordinator/IM role. However, it is also suggested that without different pay scales for more experienced people, this may be more difficult.

95.96.   The GWC has the greatest percent of FST/RRT deployments of all UNICEF clusters (40 percent of all UNICEF-related clusters in 2016), as well as the biggest user of SBPs for cluster deployments (35 percent in 2016). This also means that they are the biggest 'client' and likely to have the most interaction with the Standby Partnership Unit of UNICEF.

96.97. Retaining FST members has been difficult with most being in post for less than 18 months (source: *Survey of Past and Present FST/RRT*). This means that the experience gained by any FST member is limited, and lost when the person leaves; several FST/RRT members were lost when there were funding gaps. Such gaps cause much higher transactional costs in additional recruitment as well as limiting FST capacity.

97.98. Results from the *Survey of Past and Present FST/RRT* members[31] indicates that it is not only sustained predictable funding that needs to be addressed, but the creation of a supportive environment that effectively manages and develops individuals, integrating and recognising their potential contribution to the GWC strategy. An FST Manager who has played a senior coordination role would support a more effective management role of the position and free up more time for CAST to focus on other strategic issues.

Efficient and Effective Use of the FST

98.99. Analysis of FST deployments indicates that the greatest number of deployments support L2 (%) and L3 (%) deployments.

Level of Activation	Activated - 66%	Informal - 34%		
Type of Response	Rapid Onset - 38%	Protracted - 32%	Outbreak - 5%	Worsening Situation - 23%
Level of Emergency (Unicef)	L1 - 7%	L2 - 21%	L3 - 38%	Not Classified (20%)

99.100. The division of deployments between regions indicates a trend, largely related to where the larger humanitarian response activity is located, but it also relates to the relative capacity in deployment countries and if deployments relate to rapid onset emergencies, where coordination capacity may not be part of the regular staffing in country (which you may find in more protracted crises). The figures also represent an approximate 50-50 split between CC and IM roles, with Preparedness/Transition and Assessments representing only one deployment in 2016s

Region	Number of Deployments 2015-2016
CEE-CIS	3
EAPR	1
ESAR	7
LACR	7
MENA	10
ROSA	3
WCARO	8

100.101.   There are questions about the reality of capacity-building of national authorities and transition processes in many of the contexts that the GWC supports. There are key conditions

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[31] A separate report has been made to compile the views of past and present FST/RRT members

that need to be met to support effective transition processes. Most of the countries that have humanitarian sector/cluster coordination processes are in protracted crises and therefore support to government can often present challenges. Those that are not in protracted crises, and would benefit from capacity-building of national authorities and support to transition, require longer-term engagement and specific skill sets. Most FST members (and funding contracts) stay mainly for one, and a maximum of two, years and do not always have these skill sets. This support is likely better placed within organizations that have this skill set, as well as the ability to offer long-term support from regional and/or global levels eg UNICEF's WASH Section/ Programme Division (PD) and Regional Offices (or a similar organization with long-term working relationships to government), would seem a better fit.

~~101.~~102.   Before any reintroduction of the Regional Emergency Cluster Advisers (RECAs), it is important that the role of UNICEF Regional Office is clarified with respect to support for Clusters. There seemed to have been a transfer of responsibility to the RECAs, which was not effectively handed back when the positions were suspended. CAST therefore has the responsibility to support all coordination roles globally, which is somewhat unsustainable, and doesn't fit with how UNICEF normally operates within its global, regional and CO framework.

~~102.~~103.   The FST requires additional senior-level members to support both large L3 responses, but also to support the development, mentoring, management and support to the FST and other coordinators, as well as IM staff in the field. With an FST of up to 12 people, and the many coordination staff in the field, it is unrealistic that the Global Cluster Coordinator/CAST manage the team effectively and develop the capacity for both these roles, in addition to their other responsibilities.

~~103.~~104.   Perhaps due to a lack of seniority or UNICEF background, many FST/RRT members mention the challenge of being integrated into the UNICEF country team when deploying, feeling they are treated somewhat differently. If ways to mitigate this could be found, they would help to improve deployment effectiveness eg engagement in Country Rep forums, courtesy calls to Reps, Emergency Coordinators and Chiefs of WASH at deployment onset.

~~104.~~105.   Due to uncertainty of deployment times, it is often difficult for the 20 percent of the GWC and the agency to be used very effectively. In some cases, pieces of work get passed from one person to the next, losing time and vision in getting work completed. A review of how the time (and potential reconsideration of the division) can be applied more effectively would be useful. Since neither the agency nor the GWC are able to effectively use the time available, strong consideration should be given to giving the full 40% of time to the GWC work, or agencies could contribute in part to the salary of the FST member and retain the 40% for the agency.

~~105.~~106.   Whilst the FST coordinators have CAST to go to for technical issues, there is no specific mechanism for IM support. IM FST members are also often recruited from agencies that do not have internal IM capacity to support FST IM staff. This technical support gap could be helped by having senior capacity within the team, appropriate selection of host agencies and more effective working strategies with UNICEF's Inter-Cluster Information Management Unit.

~~106.~~107.   The FST deployment management is shared between CAST, the FST manager and UNICEF's SBP Unit. There are efficiencies to be gained by streamlining processes of deployments between these groups

Opportunities to Expand Coordination Capacity

Going Beyond the NGO Consortium Model to a Multiple Model Approach

107.108.   The FST is currently made up largely of a single consortium model of NGO staff, on 12-month contracts. Each has a 60 percent deployment capacity, 20 percent for the GWC and 20 percent for the agency itself (after holiday and R&R entitlement is removed). Whilst there have been contributions to the FST from outside of the NGO consortium eg MSB, NCA, the broader approach of having different models of contracting - 'jigsaw pieces' make up the necessary coordination capacity is yet to be recognised; the focus so far has been on just one jigsaw piece, that of the NGO consortium.

FST Coordination Capacity – Multiple Model Approach

With new leadership of the NGO consortium, the responsibility to oversee a wider process which incorporates other 'pieces of the coordination capacity jigsaw' and strategy seems to have recognised this realitytion. There is potential to look at how different models could be integrated into the NGO consortium mechanism, and not just into other pieces of FST coordination capacity.

108.109.   There could be significant opportunity to *expand the strategic advisory support for the overall development and implementation of a longer-term FST strategy* – a type of SAG for the FST. By drawing on a wider group of bodies and experts beyond the GWC, added value could be brought to the table in terms of experience of roster development and management, and potential access to new donors. The advisory group could include for example UNICEF senior HR, interested donors and senior managers of large humanitarian rosters in other organisations, who are willing to contribute to a more effective and sustained FST.

109.110.   It has been difficult to attract the highest calibre of people with only one model of contracting and operation. Some changes are being introduced (Geneva-based is not required), but it is proposed that this needs to go further.

110.111.   The UNHCR side of the Global Shelter Cluster has a mechanism they have worked on with NRC which gives them 12 months of senior (P5 level) deployable capacity through arrangements which employ 2 people on contracts, paying them 50 percent of the full salary, over 12 months; each contract requires 6 months of deployment over the 12 months, and the other 6 months they are free (since they are only paid 50 percent). This approach has attracted senior people who prefer a lower working percent and gives 100 percent senior deployment rate through 1 (senior) salary. Discussions with more experienced FST members and other experienced WASH personnel found this approach to be very interesting, as they valued the additional free time and compensation for a higher level of experience.

111.112.　　　Following on from this, there could be an opportunitiesy to look more flexibly at how to attract the right people, even within the current NGO model, including piloting the integration of consultancies:

> An example could be instead of a 12 month staff contract for one individual (which draws important social charges), with a 60% deployment rate, an equivalent 12-month contract shared between several senior coordinators). This would allow a higher consultancy rate to be paid to senior individuals, L3 capacity within the team, and towards an equivalent or greater 100% deployment rate (the current lowest deployment rate is 60% of 9 months within a 12 month contract (5.4 months, 162 days).

It is perhaps also worth exploring an expansion of UNICEF's Humanitarian Support Personnel (HSP) system to incorporate WASH coordination roles, which also operates on consultancy contracts.

112.113.　　　Discussion with some WASH agencies found that there could be more interest in supporting (and fundraising) for a percentage of an FST member where there was greater flexibility for a larger percent for the agency.

113.114.　　　The British Red Cross ran a model which involved a retainer system to ensure senior capacity for its Household Economic Security response. Those 'on-call' receive a retainer to be available for up to two months of deployment (as they are unable to take work during this period), and are paid a higher amount if deployed. This system requires investment in communication with the 'retainees' to ensure that they feel valued and part of the team.

114.115.　　　UNICEF internal redeployments are currently low, with just one internal redeployment into a WASH coordination role (and none for IM). This puts a lot of reliance on the FST for immediate response and could be viewed as a potential risk for UNICEF.

Increasing the Quality and Predictability of Standby Partnership Contribution to WASH Coordination Roles

115.116.　　　Analysing data on WASH rapid response deployments (FST and SBP, see Annex 9) for coordination and information management from 2015–2016, the SBPs contributed almost 50 percent of all rapid response deployments and nearly 70 percent in terms of the number of days contribution. However, in reviewing the trend in 2016 only (when the FST was more operational), the contribution of SBPs to the number of deployments for cluster/sector coordination roles is 31 percent (39 percent for coordinator roles and 23 percent for IMOs).

116.117.　　　WASH is the biggest user of SBPs for cluster deployments within UNICEF, both in terms of number (45 percent of all cluster SBP deployments from 2015–2016) as well as the number of days (40 percent of all days for cluster SBP deployments).

117.118.　　　Feedback from users of the SBPs for coordination needs suggest that improvements in the preparedness and quality of deployees, as well as their connectedness to GWC support (tools, advice), particularly for Information Manager roles, could improve their overall effectiveness. *Given such an important contribution to meeting coordination needs, it makes sense to review how the quality and predictability of standby staff can be improved.*

Increasing Investment in Best Roster Candidates

Work with selected SBPs to:

- Develop their rosters to increase the number of higher-calibre candidates in WASH Coordination and Information Management (in particular); work to see how more experienced staff can be attracted.
- Review the roster to identify best candidates (quality, experience and availability) to invest in. Identify candidates who have been deployed on multiple occasions and review feedback from COs.
- Invest in ensuring that these identified candidates are as well prepared as possible, including:
  o Cluster Coordination and IM training.
  o Making a connection between roster members and the Global WASH Cluster support personnel – ensuring candidate strengths and weaknesses are best understood to tailor deployments.
  o Ensuring latest tools are made available to candidates; connection with coordination and IM communities of practice to keep up to date and share experiences, contributing to a feeling of being 'part of the team'.
  o Deployment opportunities where candidates can be initially mentored.

Increasing Predictability of Standby Capacity

Work with selected SBPs to:

- Review if there were ways to work towards a more agreed level of support that the GWC could reliably call on and therefore integrate more into its capacity, ideally including the identified high-quality roster candidates to be more predictably available. This could include options such as:
  o Agreeing an amount of deployment contribution (number and duration), perhaps based on experiences of the last two years, that the Global WASH Cluster can draw down on.
  o Depending on the number of suitable candidates, considering a retainer system for specific candidates to ensure they remain available (perhaps on a reduced-salary basis, such as that implemented by the British Red Cross).
  o Deploying SBP candidate(s) to a UNICEF Regional Office to work side by side with UNICEF's Regional Emergency WASH Adviser, working on capacity-building and preparedness for clusters, as well as being deployable within that region. This would be most effective if the position was full-time and ideally for two years (although this could work for one year). This may result in specific reasons being supported, but this would still add to the overall capacity of the team.
  o Fully incorporating specific members of the rosters into the GWC's FST which would include a percent of deployment time (as per current model, dependant on discussions with the SBP) with other time being spent supporting the Global WASH Cluster. This person could be located in an NGO, developing or supporting that agency's WASH capacity or deployed fully to work with the Global WASH Cluster (potentially in Geneva).

Increasing the Quality and Systematic Approach to Co-Lead and Sub-National Coordination

118.119.   Whilst there have been strategies and serious efforts to ensure coordination, largely at the national level, it has been highlighted that coordination at sub-national levels, often where responses are happening, has been prioritised and less systematically or strategically approached.

119.120.   Whilst there has been no specific collection and analysis of this data by the GWC, it is clear that there are significant contributions, be it without a specific strategy in place. This also means that there is little credit given globally to these organizations. Many organizations contributing to these roles can be smaller with less profile at global level; often global WASH representatives of NGOs are not fully aware of the contribution and coordination roles they are taking on.

120.121.   A more strategic approach to systematically reviewing the need for co-lead and quality sub-national coordination (as well as co-leadship roles), linking country clusters, potential

<u>sub-national supporting agencies and donors. This</u> would potentially lead to faster take-up of roles, identify earlier where FST and SBPs could support sub-national coordination, gain global support from NGOs ~~in supporting roles~~ <u>interested in sub-national roles</u>, and faster link the donors who may be interested in support.

Improving Capacity and Support for WASH Coordination Roles

~~121.~~122.   The main mechanism to support coordinators (FST and UNICEF staff) is through CAST at the global level. IMOs in the FST have a network between them to provide support, even when in the field. Potentially, because there isn't a senior focal point for IM within CAST, there are few linkages between FST IMOs, IMO UNICEF staff and IMOs deployed through the SBPs, so knowledge and tools are less shared.

~~122.~~123.   IMOs currently do not have a natural linkage to a UNICEF section or department at country, regional or global levels. The recent recruitment of a dedicated IM within UNICEF's HR indicates a recognition of the importance of the role, as well as the size of the gap at field level. Linkages with UNICEF's M&E have yet to lead to firm ownership but need to be pursued if the IM position needs of clusters are to be mainstreamed within UNICEF.

~~123.~~124.   UNICEF WASH Cluster/Sector Coordinators and FST members could benefit from being part of the (largely technical) capacity-building and sharing of information that is promoted by UNICEF's WASH Section in NY, as well through Regional WASH Advisers <u>– building capacity, but also providing a closer link to other parts of the CLA for Unicef staff and FST members playing WASH coordination roles</u>.

Summary Options to Strengthen Coordination

Options to Strengthen Coordination			
	Various	**Standby Partnerships**	**UNICEF**
Mechanisms to Support Greater Predictability and Quality of Coordination Capacity	- Identification of donors who will give multi-year funding - Ensure trained, experienced people are targeted for recruitment/ field posts	- Invest in development of key roster members – e.g. training, tools, link to communities of practice for CC and IM - Identify how capacity of SBP rosters can be more predictably drawn on	- Underwriting of core FST Team costs to secure quality and longer-term investment - Mainstream FST role into UNICEF positions – HQ and Regional Offices
Mechanisms for Staffing Contributions	- GWC NGO consortium - Increasing in-kind contributions from other agencies (with flexibility for different terms of engagement to current	- Greater integration of existing CC, IM and assessment capacity into long-term Standby Partner Rosters (getting existing trained capacity onto rosters to be deployable) - Work with SBPs to develop rosters to be	- UNICEF contributing senior staff capacity to FST (PD contribution through an ERT); Potentially New-York based; increased connection between GWC, PD WASH section and other New York divisions; capacity to support development of internal redeployment roster for cluster coordination

Options to Strengthen Coordination			
	consortium model) - Consultant agreements with experienced staff	able to fill critical gaps in IM capacity - Consider GENCap/PROCap deployments to the GWC to provide a more strategic approach to appropriate and accountable responses	- Identify and develop (where gaps) roster of internal UNICEF capacity for internal redeployment to cluster/sector coordination roles in emergencies - Work with new dedicated HR person supporting IM surge and emergency deployments
Funding/Cost Recovery Mechanisms	- Include deployment costs in NGO donor submissions for country level operations (*could this be done by the NGO consortium lead agency for the FST?*)	-	- Access to funds raised by UNICEF for coordination for specific emergencies - Thematic funding underwriting the FST Team - Increased cost recovery from COs for FST deployments - More systematic approach to incorporation of coordination roles into UNICEF's HAC and its specific funding proposals - Development of 'Special Operations' appeals[32] or ensure coordination is specifically mentioned in UNICEF's HAC - Review potential for UNICEF's EPF to be used to support the underwriting of the FST and eventual replenishment by COs using the FST services

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[32] À la WFP, a specific Special Operations Appeal is developed for the Logistics Cluster for each emergency

Funding of Coordination

124.125.   A review of UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) Appeals (Annex 11) found 48 percent (13 of 27) of appeals made an explicit request for cluster coordination costs[33], with an average of 2–3 percent of the value of the UNICEF appeal. Given that the coordination is to support the entire sector, coordination costs for WASH are likely to be less than 1 percent of the funds requested for the WASH response, e.g. In Yemen, requested coordination costs are less than 0.5 percent.

125.126.   Reviewing all the Humanitarian Response and Flash Appeals of 2016 (35), only 4 (11 percent) explicitly requested funds for WASH Coordination, although 54 percent included coordination as part of the strategy (Annex 11).

126.127.   Coordinators in longer-term positions are often not aware of how their positions are funded, or are asked to help fundraise for it. Although there is guidance for UNICEF COs[34], most coordinators do not have their own budgets with many relying upon their negotiation with the Chief of WASH to gain resources for coordination activities. There are also more predictable approaches where allocated budget amounts are held under the Emergency Coordinator.

127.128.   UNICEF's current approach to fundraising for coordination is inconsistent, sometimes making a separate budget request (in HRPs or UNICEF HACs) or it is assumed in other cases that coordination costs have been integrated broadly into emergency support and WASH programming. Further work is needed to fully understand the approach(es) taken by UNICEF and how to bring greater consistency and an evidence-based approach.

128.129.   A percentage of WASH sector appeals is also an interesting approach to take with donors to fund coordination. If we review the cost of the FST in relation to the total funding received requested for the WASH sector (per OCHA's Financial Tracking System (FTS), the FST represents less thanaround 0.42 percent, which to provide effective rapid response support and more, suggests good value for money. There is potentially much less transactional costs if funding for the FST is given globally than recuperating costs from the country level.

129.130.   Funding of the FST currently comes from ECHO and OFDA (8–18 months validity), both of whom are struggling to provide continuing funding in the long term, with an expectation that UNICEF find a way to mainstream/find other means of longer-term funding, as the FST is a recurrent global cost. Other Unicef Clusters that have been less successful in fundraising, have been more successful in able to accessing Unicef Thematic Funding through EMOPs.

Unless very different donors (those willing to make longer-term commitments) can be found, there needs to be a way to ensure the continuity of the FST; otherwise the recurrent problems of quality, retainment rates and gaps in provision will continue, all affecting the quality of the response. *The use of UNICEF's Thematic Funding and/or EPF to underwrite FST costs, coupled with a longer-term strategy to recover deployment costs from UNICEF COs, could provide some answers.*

130.131.   UNICEF and the GWC could benefit from improved communications on the cost and value of coordination, but in particular, greater *evidence* and case studies of how it benefits the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the sector response.

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[33] None of the HAC appeals mentioned any outcomes for coordination, but focused in on outcomes only of programmes.
[34] Cluster Coordination Guidance for UNICEF Country Offices

Introducing a Cost Recovery Approach to the FST

132.   The FST has been funded largely by ECHO and OFDA, initially passing funds through UNICEF and then directly to a GWC partner who operated the budget for the NGO Consortium. The GWC RRT/FST was the first rapid response cluster mechanism put in place in 2009 and therefore has been funded by donors for the last 9 years, the longest of any cluster. It is perhaps little surprise that donors are struggling to continue to justify supporting a mechanism which is seen as an on-going need with an expectation of mainstreaming.

Whilst there has been donors support for 9 years, there have been different mechanisms (Initially a small RRT, then the RAT, RECAs and RRT), which were then brought back together as the FST in 201XX through the NGO consortium. This perhaps explains to a certain extent why a focus on finding alternative funding mechanisms have been limited.

131.133.   More recently, additional FST members have been added by partners who have been able to contribute members 'in-kind', finding their own funding, e.g. NCA and MSB.

134.   Whilst we know that the mechanism of an RRT/FST is cost-effective in delivering a team of qualified, rapidly-deployable staff, finding resources on a continuous basis to support initiatives managed at a global level is challenging. Whilst donors such as DfID have indicated that they prefer to see such mechanisms mainstreamed into headquarter responsibilities, others are more willing to fund coordination through resources for specific emergencies; some donors ask why the full fundraising capacity of UNICEF is not fully behind fundraising for the FST.

132.135.   This section describes background information and context for cost recovery and ends with next steps for potentially implementing a cost recovery component.

Cost Recovery Systems for Rapid Response Teams within UNICEF and GWC Partners Exist Already

133.136.   In UNICEF's own internal rapid response mechanisms, there are already partial or full-cost recovery approaches integrated. Often funds are initially taken from UNICEF's internal Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) to make things move faster and then refunded from Funding Commitments (internal budget code) back to the EPF.

UNICEF Internal Rapid Response Mechanisms	Availability	Cost Recovery
Dedicated Response Capacity		
Emergency Response Team (ERT) *No WASH Sector/Coordination role included in team*	- six to eight weeks (P4, P5)	- PARTIAL – DSA/Travel - Salary paid by WASH Section of Programme Division (for the WASH ERT member)
Humanitarian Support Personnel (HSP) *No WASH Sector/Coordination role included in team*	- Not fixed (P3 level consultants)	- FULL – 105 percent cost recovery (to support non-deployment time) - Asks for budget (Fund Commitment) from CO, valid for one year to facilitate fund use to extend contracts of HSPs.

Redeployment of Existing Staff		
Immediate Response Team (IRT) *No WASH Sector/Coordination role included in team*	- L3 responses - Up to three months	- PARTIAL – DSA/Travel - Salary paid by office/programme from where the staff member is already a duty staff

134.137.   Throughout interviews with GWC operational partners, almost all had a cost recovery system for their internal emergency response capacity. At country level they raised funds for specific emergencies, with posts underwritten largely by their humanitarian departments and most with the flexibility to deploy even if there were funding challenges at country level, whether in the short term or otherwise.

135.138.   In interviews with UNICEF staff as users of the FST, all indicated that they saw a quality difference/reliability with the FST, as well as their ability to deploy quickly, and often provide on-going support and would be willing to pay for the support that they receive; they responded either as budget holders or convinced it would not be difficult to convince the budget holder as the case is strong. Many said that it made sense that to support the sustainability of the team, they understood it needed to move to a cost recovery system, just as UNICEF and other NGO systems have done with their own systems. As with these mechanisms, there would need to be a firm commitment by UNICEF to find mechanisms that can work simply for UNICEF COs and a phased and flexible approach to its introduction.

> The experience for standby capacity for Rapid Response Teams across humanitarian organisations suggests that when the concept has proved its worth (and if sustained resources to cover costs are not realistic), then a move to an '*under-written*' partial or full cost recovery mechanism is the most common route to sustainability . *It is therefore a very natural progression that the GWC FST, the oldest of all global cluster rapid response mechanisms, moves to a cost recovery basis, even if it will be charting new waters as it goes, as it did in the beginning.*

Cost Recovery Mechanisms Within Other Clusters

136.139.   In the earlier years of the RRT, the GWC introduced a cost-sharing approach with UNICEF COs when funds were limited, by asking them to pay deployment costs.

The Logistics Cluster operates a large global support team (23 people), which raises funds to cover its support and deployments through Special Operations (SOs) appeals for individual emergencies; coordination needs are bundled up with other logistics cluster/coordination service functions. The SOs (signed off at Executive Director level) are underwritten by WFP who use internal funds to prefund whilst waiting for donor funds. The SO appeals seem to be a successful mechanism allowing a large flexible team (mix of staff, consultants and Partners) on a range of contracts to operate.

The IFRC-managed arm of the Shelter Cluster also operates a cost recovery component. Budgets (managed by the Global Shelter Cluster) written for country level response include a component of global support. The country level shelter cluster budget complements that of the IFRC response but there is a firewall in-between because of how the Global Shelter Cluster responsibilities are internally managed. Funds are also raised through the fees charged for Cluster Coordinator Training which runs twice per year with fees of CHF 1,800 per participant.

The Global Food Security Cluster covers the first month of costs and then any further costs are covered by the CO – not all of these are UN staff. Within the group of deployees, several are staff positions of which the costs have been mainstreamed, but there are also non-staff and Partner roles integrated into the team.

How Might a Cost Recovery System Function?

~~137.~~140. Key aspects that make the FST attractive to COs, in order of importance include:

1. Rapid	2. High-calibre staff	3. Experienced in the role
4. Very light process to procure	5. Free cost	6. Link to GWC support

~~138.~~141. The first three aspects are largely seen by users to set the FST apart from the SBP. In any cost recovery system, therefore, the most important aspect which must remain is that *any cost recovery process needs to be light for the field to process*.

~~139.~~142. There are two approaches to cost recovery – Partial and Full.

	Mechanism	Mode of Operation	Comments
Partial	DSA/flight covered by deployment	- The most simple in operational terms is for UNICEF to pay DSA directly to FST member[35] in-country	- Would reduce the burden on the FST budget by 35–45 percent of costs during deployment - DSA paid would be higher than that paid by the NGO partner – this would be the compromise the CO would make for simpler systems - Would not contribute to costs during non-deployment time (40 percent non-deployed) - Partial cost recovery could be Phase one of the introduction of a cost recovery approach
Full	Salary and DSA during deployment	- Would operate most easily with a lump sum cost for all FST members[36] - Deployment costs for senior FST members could be incorporated	- Would need to look at which mechanism could work operationally - Consider UNICEF's Emergency Programme Fund as part of developing and supporting such a mechanism - Could operate through flexible PCA arrangements with partners

~~140.~~143. A flexible and phased approach to cost recovery may be useful to implement whilst systems are designed to fully develop a cost recovery system.

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[35] Would need to check on
[36] Currently there isn't very much difference between monthly costs of NGO consortium members

141.144.　　　It is important to discuss key aspects of the future and funding of the FST with the relevant UNICEF divisions to find a way forward to support its costs and potential underwriting of the team to support greater predictably, improve the calibre of members, improve retainment levels, ideally leading to a three to five year planning horizon.

Potential Challenges to Cost Recovery for the FST

142.145.　　　One of the greater challenges to introducing a cost recovery system is that whilst partial cost recovery has been introduced in the past, and other clusters have such systems, none of UNICEF's cluster RRTs/FSTs have introduced a cost recovery system yet and therefore will be breaking the mould. Having a cost recovery system for one cluster in UNICEF and not for others may need to be explained to COs.

143.146.　　　SBP deployments remain a non-contributory resource for UNICEF COs. Some at global level are concerned that COs will select SBPs instead of the FST due to cost implications. This concern, however, was not expressed in interviews with the users of the FST and SBPs. The two systems are largely seen differently – each bringing something different, but complementary to the table. The main provisos emphasised by users for the success of any cost recovery system is that it must be simple, light and potentially paid for several months later so as not to delay deployments.

144.147.　　　It is likely that a system which recovers costs from UNICEF COs may need to work with PCAs for contributing NGOs to utilise internal funds (thematic or EPF equally).

145.148.　　　Unfortunately, this research piece has been unable to engage with appropriate staff of UNICEF to examine cost recovery systems (DFAM, EPF managers) and therefore will need to be followed-up on.

Potential Steps Forward to Implementing a Cost Recovery System

146.149.　　　Data presented above identified that given that there are no ERT or IRT coordination positions within UNICEF, and only one internal redeployment of staff to take up the cluster coordination role in 2016. Whilst a cost recover system would be a logical way forward to ensure the future of the FST, a number of other decisions needs to be made which may affect the decision.

    a. Recognition by the CLA of the importance the FST plays in meeting rapid response cluster coordination roles and the critical role played by partners using the data provided in this report.

    b. Review what role UNICEF's internal resources should play in providing rapid response for cluster/sector coordination roles, the contributions SBPs make and the staff that UNICEF engage in longer-term protracted crises.

    c. Potentially underwriting the FST to give it medium to longer-term predictability and allow investment in the team.

    d. Review how new donors could be brought on board (with support from Unicef's Funding and Partnership divisions).

    e. Make a decision on whether a cost recovery system is the way forward for UNICEF's clusters[37]

    f. Move more quickly to partial cost recovery in terms of DSA and flight costs from funds raised by country offices before a full cost recovery system is in place.

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[37] Whilst the GWC is ready to implement a cost recovery system, other UNICEF-led cluster may not be in the same position.

g. Identify mechanisms by which costs can be recovered for FST costs from country resources raised for the emergency, as is done for UNICEF's HSP (e.g. through simple Funding Commitments, PCAs or Long Term Agreements(LTAs))[38]. We know there are several ways of doing this, but the best route will depend on other decisions made regarding the future of the FST.

h. Explore how tools such as the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) can help to ensure no delays in deploying teams.

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[38] Attempts were made to engage with Operations Officers to review potential mechanisms, but this was not successful.

Global WASH Cluster - Quality, Effective, Predictable and Efficient Coordination Capacity

Recommendations

Important and Urgent	█	Important	█	Quick Win	█

Those indicated in blue as quick-wins does not indicate necessarily a lower important, they may just be more simple to implement, but have significant impact

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
Coordination Capacity			
Work with expert consulting groups and academics to develop and implement a methodology to measure the benefit and impact of coordination to make an effective business case to government donors and private foundations.	CAST/SAG/GWC Academics/EMOPs	While many donors are supportive of coordination, they often find it difficult to justify coordination. Since the two Cluster Evaluation Reports (2007, 2010) were written, there has been no specific work to follow-up on this. Even ECHO, as a major supporter of the WASH Cluster, and the broader cluster approach, feels it would be of significant benefit to have a stronger evidence base for coordination. The evidence/case studies may also assist in communicating the importance of coordination capacity to UNICEF and Reps.	(red)
Work with Other UNICEF clusters, fundraising divisions and EMOPS to have an agreed approach to fundraising for coordination costs at country level.	EMOPS/CAST/ WASH-PD	Few HRPs (11 percent) make explicit requests for coordination costs; and just under half of UNICEF humanitarian appeals have a budget specifically to support coordination costs. Some cluster coordinators at country level are asked to try to fundraise to cover their coordination costs; and some UNICEF regions explicitly raise funds for coordination capacity-building. It would appear that there is no specific approach for raising funds for coordination which may have an impact on funding that is made available.	(orange)
Increase Involvement of UNICEF and WASH Section to the FST and contribution to coordination capacity more broadly to Respond to L3 emergencies.	CAST/ WASH-PD/EMOPs	Currently, contributions to the FST come from donor governments and largely through NGO partners of the GWC (MSB excluded). The GWC is looking to expand and strengthen its partnerships to increase the predictability and quality of its FST. From not only a partnership point of view, but also to increase senior-calibre candidates, it would be helpful if UNICEF could contribute a staff member to the deployment capacity of the FST. This could be done through the expansion of the ERT or HSPs. Developing a strategy for UNICEF staff to become part of the standing capacity available for cluster coordinator roles would also increase the internal rapid response capacity.	(orange)
Invest to Increase the predictability and quality of WASH coordination support from SBPs.	CAST/EMOPs Partnership Unit/SBPs	Given their significant contribution to coordination capacity at field level, work with SBPs, investing in key coordination and IM capacity within their rosters. Information management capacity is particularly a challenge across the FST and SBP and therefore warrants special attention; IM is also a capacity that does not naturally exist in UNICEF's staff profiles. Tools and products are also somehow specific so is difficult to pick capacity 'off the shelf' and therefore ensuring IM roster members are aware and familiar with the tools, will certainly improve their effectiveness in the field.	(orange)

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
		Consider GENCap/PROCap deployments to the GWC to provide a more strategic approach to appropriate and accountable responses. A list of potential ways to do this is given in the narrative section on coordination capacity.	
Work with EMOPs and Programme Division M&E sections to review how the cluster IM role could find a 'home' and become more mainstreamed within UNICEF.	EMOPs/UNICEF M&E/Inter-Cluster Unit	Both recent and past linkages with Unicef's M&E sections has yet to lead to firm ownership but need to be pursued if the IM position and IM needs of clusters is to be mainstreamed within Unicef. Reviewing how data and information management is supported in Unicef WASH PD, may also identify potential routes. Opportunities for the capacity within Unicef's Inter-Cluster IM Unit to support the WASH IM FST and coordination capacity broadly should be explored.	
Identification and setting up of a donor group open to support coordination at country level and actively engage during emergencies; develop template projects/communication documents which describe the value and contribution of coordination.	CAST/SAG/EMOPs	Having an active and systematic strategy to support the justification and funding of coordination costs can assist in ensuring an appropriate coordination structure is put in place as early as possible. Actively describing the outcomes of coordination can assist donors in understanding why it needs to be specifically funded. Specific teleconferences with the field, involving NGOs and donors, can facilitate the communication of needs and the strategy. The Shelter Cluster (IFRC) actively engages with its donors to ensure that coordination is included when they are setting up in an emergency.	
Work with EMOPs colleagues and HR to review the need for sector coordination roles to be an integral part of its trained internal L3 response capacity	CAST/WASH-PD/ EMOPs/ Unicef GCCs	There is a lack of clarity why sector/cluster coordination and IM roles are not an integral part of Unicef's internal L3 capacity. There are certainly questions regarding FST capacity to respond to large rapid onset L3 emergencies and it is unclear what internal capacity exists to fill this potential gap.	
Develop a more systematic approach to sub-national and co-lead arrangements to speed up and improve effectiveness.	CAST/GWC/Donors	Sub-national coordination has been highlighted as a large deficit in the effective implementation of responses. Currently these arrangements occur somewhat organically, are made in-country and often not as a priority. The global WASH cluster could identify those organizations who are already supporting these roles and review what can be done to improve the effectiveness and rapid implementation of these roles. The GWC could hold emergency response calls at the beginning of an emergency with key response agencies, donors and coordinators from the field; sub-national coordination could be more systematically implemented and support identified.	
Improve and diversify mechanisms by which all coordination staff in the field can be supported. Create and connect Communities of Practice for coordinators and IMOs.	CAST/Inter-Cluster IM/HR-IM	Simple Skype communities of coordinators and IMOs across all positions - incorporating staff, SBP or FST, would most likely result in more support, better knowledge management and a sense of 'team', but importantly, less pressure on CAST to provide more simple support (tools, information, shared experiences) and increased time for more strategic engagement. For IMOs there would be a greater connection across the different staffing mechanisms, resulting in UNICEF and SBP IMOs	

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
		being more connected with the latest approaches and tools. A new IM HR officer in UNICEF also lays greater opportunities for improved connectedness. Ensure UNICEF WASH Cluster/Sector Coordinators are linked into the technical support given by its HQ Programme Division and Regional WASH Support.	
Field Support Team			
Increase involvement and commitment of UNICEF to increase predictability of FST by underwriting the costs of the FST.	CAST/EMOPs/ WASH-PD	The FST plays a critical role in providing rapid response coordination capacity, as the data (shown in narrative) clearly shows. It is important that a strategy is agreed upon to improve the sustained predictability of the FST. Current funding for the FST runs out in August/September 2017, so the issue is somewhat urgent. An important role that UNICEF as CLA for WASH can play in sustaining the predictability of the FST (ensuring its CLA responsibilities for WASH coordination) would be to underwrite the costs of the FST. Given that the FST/RRT has been in existence since 2008, there has been the ability to raise funds for the FST (although not always in a timely way) with minimum risk for UNICEF. This could also support the stronger involvement of internal mechanisms within UNICEF in raising funds for FST costs, as well as strengthen the internal business case for cost recovery of FST costs for their deployment to country level responses.	
Develop a Phased Cost Recovery Strategy for the FST.	CAST/EMOPS/DFAM	Cost recovery is almost inevitable for the FST, as is the case for most other agencies, including UNICEF, after a 'proof of concept' period, though 100 percent cost recovery may be difficult. An outline of options has been made in the narrative and the first step is a senior-level meeting of stakeholders to review data and options, as well as a more consistent approach by COs to fundraise for coordination. Ensuring the continuity of the FST or taking alternative strategies to ensure rapid response to support emergency response and an effective WASH response, is critically important. Current funding for the FST runs out in August/September 2017, so the issue is somewhat urgent.	
Apply a multi-donor and multi-year funding approach to support additional funding of the FST and a cost recovery approach.	CAST/EMOPs/ Donors/FST Senior Advisory Group	To allow greater flexibility in searching for funds for the FST and to allow more donors to contribute, it should be considered to accept smaller amounts of funding which cover X months of the FST, or to support specific roles within the FST. An important aspect of receiving smaller amounts is that the funding should be flexible to be used over longer periods. This would allow more donors to contribute to the FST and allow the promotion, trialling and establishment of a cost recovery system and facilitate UNICEF underwriting the FST. Currently funding for the NGO consortium comes from ECHO and OFDA and lasts for one to two years. To develop a cost recovery approach, it would be helpful to have funds which may contribute several months of funds to the FST, but be valid over a much longer period.	

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
Implement a strategy of flexibility and multiple models to ensure the calibre and 'right-sizing' of the FST.	CAST/NCA/FST Senior Advisory Group/EMOPs	In developing an overall FST strategy to meet the different response needs for coordination and information management, different models of contracting may support the introduction of a wider range of skills and experience into the team. Some organizations may be willing to fundraise and contribute to the FST, but with different terms and conditions, e.g. willing to commit a percent of a person with the other percentage completely for the agency, so 50/50. In the past, a roster was kept of those people who had been trained in coordination and information management and at which level of emergency they were best suited to support. Since the FST model was adapted as the only model for the GWC to support the field with coordination capacity, this roster of trained individuals has been discarded, with the consequence of potentially losing out on many individuals who could provide coordination and IM leadership.	
Agree a comprehensive strategy to increase senior capacity in the FST	CAST/NCA/EMOPs/ WASH-PD/Senior Advisory Group	There have been several comments suggesting that the FST needs senior deployable capacity. It is important to understand what would attract senior WASH/IM to the posts. Senior capacity could be brought into the FST through separate senior roles (paid a senior rate), identified specifically as L3 response coordinators/IM. They could have greater responsibility for the mentoring and support to FST and other staff in coordinator/IM roles. They could also lead work on knowledge management in their own fields, skills capacity development (including SBPs) and training, as well as deployment at a lower deployment rate. Often, senior and experience people are willing to be deployed for several months in the year, but may not want a 100 percent contract and may find it difficult to fit this within a contract with an NGO. More flexible arrangements could be made through consultancy-type contracts or staff contracts at a lower percent (e.g. Shelter Cluster/NRC examples). Agreements could be made to bring several individuals together to ensure senior coverage for deployment throughout the year. When reaching out to senior capacity during recruitment, some have indicated that they were unaware of recent recruitment drives and may have been interested in these posts. More needs to be done to reach out to high-calibre candidates to apply for posts.	
Improve retention rates of FST members.	CAST/NCA/EMOP Partnership Unit/Senior Advisory Group	Excluding longer-term contracts, there are other aspects of FST management and support that need to be addressed to improved retention rates of FST members. Feeling valued, becoming an integral part of the team, progression within the position and a professional development approach are aspect that would contribute to this (many FST staff have not been trained in cluster coordination or information management, despite several coordination trainings taking place in 2016). The Survey of Past and Present FST/RRT Members will be help to guide the development of a strategy.	
Review the strategy to support assessments at country level through the FST.	CAST/GWC TWG Assessments/ CDC/Reach	There have been three FST deployments in 2015–2016 for assessments representing 4–8 percent of all deployments. Whilst this may not represent the importance of assessments, it	

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
		perhaps raises a question about whether a full-time FST member for assessments is the most efficient way to support this. The Shelter Cluster assessment capacity is held within REACH and is drawn down for country deployment when needed, which they would be open to do for the GWC, perhaps rather than having a dedicated person sitting inside the FST. CDC is interested in supporting assessment further, potentially with dedicated capacity. A review examining the impact of not doing quality assessments is critical in identifying gaps. It is often cited that the food and nutrition sectors are always well organised with data – what is it about these sectors which puts them ahead of WASH?	
Set up a broad senior advisory group for the overall FST consortium/partnership to include key opinion and technical leaders as advisers.	CAST/NCA/EMOPs	The role of the FST consortium goes beyond the management and receipt of grants to fund FST members. There are key individuals, donors, roster management experts and other organizations that can bring added value to developing and supporting a broader FST strategy - an additional sounding board from other experts in this field. Co-chair(s) could also be formed which could add another dimension to the leadership role - e.g. a donor or roster management expert.	
Agree and implement a strategy to streamline and improve effective management, training and monitoring of the FST.	CAST/NCA/EMOP Partnership Unit	These multiple, and sometimes confusing, layers of management of FST staff are not always helpful for maximising the effectiveness and career development of staff. A clear and systematic approach to FST management needs further investment. A review of how the time (and potential reconsideration of the division) can be applied more effectively would be useful.	
		Perhaps due to a lack of seniority or UNICEF background, FST/RRT members mention the challenge of being integrated into the UNICEF country team when deploying. Review means by which to mitigate this, it may improve deployment effectiveness.	
		Having an FST manager who has played a senior coordination role would support a more direct management role of the position and free up more time for CAST to focus on other strategic issues.	
		Many of the current FST members have not followed cluster coordination training and therefore are not as fully prepared as they could be, despite the fact that there have been opportunities through the six cluster coordinator training sessions held at country and regional levels in 2016. The package of induction materials for cluster coordinators is not easily available.	
		As the largest single 'client' of the SBP services, discussion, clarification and streamlining of FST processes and monitoring with UNICEF's SBP unit would be beneficial. There are also opportunities for greater integration of the FST Manager into the work of the SBP Unit	
Streamline Focus of FST – review the reality of capacity-building and transition support to clusters and work with UNICEF's PD to hand over its support.	CAST/NCA/EMOPs	There are questions about the reality of capacity-building of national authorities and transition processes in many of the contexts that the GWC supports. There are key conditions that need to be met to support effective transition processes. Most of the countries that have humanitarian sector/cluster	

Recommendation	Responsible	Rationale	Priority
		coordination processes are in protracted crises and therefore support to government can often present challenges. Those that are not in protracted crises and would benefit from capacity-building of national authorities and support to transition, require long-term engagement and specific skill sets. Most FST members (and funding contracts) stay mainly for one, and a maximum of two, years and do not have these skill sets. This field support is likely better placed within organizations that already have these skill sets, and can offer long-term support at regional and/or global Levels – e.g. UNICEF's WASH Section/PD and Regional Offices (or a similar organization with long-term working relationships with the government).	
Agree criteria before the re-introduction of Regional Emergency Cluster Advisers (RECAs).	CAST/NCA/EMOPs	Prior to the introduction of the RECA roles, a lot of support for clusters/sector coordination was given by UNICEF's Regional (Emergency) WASH Advisers. Those RECAs who worked closely/were co-located with UNICEF advisers seemed to work more effectively. The introduction of the roles seemed to relieve the UNICEF advisers of this responsibility and it was never handed back effectively. The lack of a clear UNICEF regional office role for support to clusters makes this even more challenging. Most support to clusters is now given at the global level by CAST, which is not sustainable.	
Consider Cash Expertise to become a formal part of the FST for the next two years.	CAST/GWC TWG Cash/EMOPs/NRC CashCap/Donors	The use of Cash as a principal mechanism for humanitarian response is becoming more important and donors are looking more to this as a specific means to cover most humanitarian needs. WASH is not a sector that has a lot of experience, but there are opportunities to support WASH analysis and responses in emergencies. There is also a need to monitor the use of Cash in achieving WASH outcomes to feed into the evidence base of the effectiveness of Cash to do this. The dedicated position could be used to carry out training and develop tools and guidance for WASH programming. Opportunities exist for funding such a position, from the NRC-managed CashCap and specific donors such as DfID and potentially more broadly, as this is one of the specific focus areas of the Grand Bargain.	

Annexes

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Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Implementation of the Global WASH Cluster Strategic Plan 2016–-2020: resource mobilization strategy and partnership arrangements

Terms of Reference

Background

In 2005, the Humanitarian Reform Agenda reviewed the effectiveness of emergency response in order to enhance predictability, accountability and partnership. The cluster approach was one of the elements introduced by this reform, with a clear mandate for improving coordination in emergencies. The Global WASH Cluster (GWC) was formed in 2006, building upon the successes of an existing Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) humanitarian sector working group with the primary purpose of the cluster to deliver WASH services assistance to affected populations during emergencies through improved coordination of the response at all levels. The GWC is an open and formal platform for humanitarian WASH actors to work together in partnership. The forum now consists of 32 full-members, comprising International Organizations, United Nations agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations. Civil Contingency/response agencies, academic institutes, stakeholders from the private sector and donors also play an active role.

In 2011 the Global WASH Cluster Partners set up a five-year strategic plan around five outcomes, encompassing thirteen core initiatives. These initiatives were reflecting the priority areas of work and enabled allocation of responsibility for related outputs and activities across key actors. A lessons-learned workshop held in early 2014[39] highlighted:

- The need to move away from the stand-alone project approaches and cultivate synergies between the various functional aspects of GWC operational support focusing on high-risk countries and provision of more tailored support;

- The successful approach of core initiatives such as the operational support provided to countries, but recommended the integration of the components of the field support mechanisms as a way of enhancing the efficiency of the team both in time and finances. This was the keystone for the establishment of the current Field Support Team (FST) established in July 2015 and fully operational in June 2016 under the supervision of the Cluster Advisory and Support Team (CAST) based Geneva;

- The important challenges such as the mutual accountability of partners to effectively implement the strategy.

Four core principles drive the new Global WASH Cluster Strategic Plan 2016-2020 : i) partnership with WASH stakeholders; ii) Interconnectedness of global and national coordination mechanisms; iii) Inter-cluster linkages; iv) Capturing lessons learned as a means of improving accountability to affected populations. The Strategy document is in a consolidation process and should be adopted by the Global WASH Cluster Partners at the next Global WASH Cluster meeting that will be held end of November in Kathmandu. It has three key expected outcomes:

1. To provide operational support to national emergency WASH coordination platforms to meet the cluster core functions under the Transformative Agenda (6+1) through timely operational support;

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[39] Global WASH Cluster: Evaluation of the Support Provided to National Coordination Platforms. Avenir Analytics 2014

2. To ensure that relevant WASH stakeholders have the capacity to coordinate in emergency response;

3. To influence and advocate for improved emergency WASH coordination

Rationale

Investment in some key GWC initiatives - including the field support mechanism - has demonstrated tangible results outlining the value and effectiveness of GWC support to in-country operations in cooperation with UNICEF Regional Offices. In the framework of the new GWC strategic plan, it is envisioned that these efforts will be reinforced to continue and strengthen the support to national WASH coordination platforms. This should however take into consideration that:

- Funding and in-kind support to implement the Global WASH Cluster Strategic Plan has been received mainly from five key Global WASH Cluster partners: ECHO, OFDA, SIDA SDC, the Norwegian MFA, and UNICEF. Sustaining this financial support and expanding the basis of the Global WASH Cluster donor platform continues to pose challenges for GWC partners. The GWC needs to put in place mechanisms to enlarge the platform, and ensure stable and more predictable funding to meet its core commitments as outlined on the GWCSP 2016-2020 and the humanitarian reform agenda;

- The current working arrangements for the GWC distribute accountability among partners regarding operational and strategic responsibilities. Whilst the quality of in-country cluster coordination functions and day-to-day support from the global level to countries remain the core responsibility of UNICEF as the Cluster Led Agency (CLA), the efforts to achieve the GWC strategic objectives and provide operational support (through the field support mechanism mainly, but not solely) requires a strong commitment from the GWC partners. This has been to some extent recognized with the involvement of IFRC in collaboration with ACF; ACTED; NCA; OXFAM and SI to setup and lead the FST consortium which has opened new opportunities in terms of partnership and mutual accountability within the GWC, and would merit further exploration to enhance predictability of the support to WASH humanitarian coordination platforms.

- In-kind partners'engagement in the GWC platform has taken several facets. Partners have provided a lasting commitment through their participation in numerous Project Steering Committees from 2006 to 2010, and in working groups structured around the different expected outputs of the previous Strategic Plans. In addition some partners are engaged in Technical Working Groups as well as in the Strategic Advisory Committee.

Purpose

Within the framework of the GWC strategic plan 2016-2020, the purpose of the consultancy is twofold: 1) widen the scope of resource mobilization efforts in order to ensure a secure and stable funding source to implement the strategy; 2) strengthen partnership arrangements to ensure predictability and accountability in the GWC operational support to National humanitarian WASH coordination structures, as prescribed in the Transformative agenda.

Objectives

1. To recommend optimal working arrangements among GWC partners that optimize mutual accountability and maximize efficiency and predictability of the GWC operational support to national humanitarian coordination structures;
2. To outline potential roles and contributions of the GWC partners in the framework of the GWC strategy 2016-2020;
3. To identify financial mechanisms, minimum resources required and setup a resource mobilization strategy to support the roll-out of the GWC strategic plan 2016-2020.

Tasks

1. Based on the lessons learned from GWC engagements so far and the changing humanitarian landscape, review and analyse the GWC working arrangements;
2. Confirm organizational requirements to allow UNICEF and the GWC partners to fulfill their engagements in the framework of the Transformative Agenda and the new GWC Strategic Plan (GWCSP) 2016-2020;
3. Produce a review of possible working arrangements, identifying weaknesses, strengths, opportunities and threats for each of them, among the GWC Field Support Team (FST) consortium, Cluster Advisory Support

Team (CAST), Strategic Advisory Group (SAG), and WASH partners that allows predictability and efficiency of the GWC's operational support to national WASH coordination platforms;

4. Map GWC partners' readiness and commitments to invest in in-kind, financial and/or organizational resources to contribute to the GWCSP 2016-2020;
5. Review any possible cost recovery mechanism/s that could be applied for GWC operational support to countries (i.e. through the Field Support Team project);
6. Develop an inventory of financial mechanisms within GWC partners Organizations that can be mobilized to support the funding of the GWCSP 2016-2020;
7. Map donors' commitments and possible funding to support the framework of the new GWSP (Including identification of possible non-traditional donors; eg. Foundations, trust funds, etc);
8. Identify a breakdown of resources requirements and structures to fulfil the GWCSP 2016-2020;
9. Develop a resource mobilization strategy for the Global WASH Cluster for the next five years identifying actions and arrangements among partners to effectively mobilize resources towards the achievement of the strategy objectives
10. Support the GWC CAST and/or SAG to organize a donor meeting to present the results of the consultancy;

Deliverables

The expected duration for the assignment is 60 days phased out as follows:
1. Produce an Inception Report and Work Plan - within two weeks of the assignment commencement
2. Produce an Intermediary Report and Powerpoint presentation (to be presented at the GWC meeting in November 2016) - *within two months of the assignment commencement* including :
    2.1. An Analysis of GWC structure and partnership with a review of possible working arrangements, identifying weaknesses, strengths, opportunities and threats;
    2.2. An outline of the resource mobilization strategy, identifying breakdown of resources requirements and structures, and mapping donors;
3. Based on the feedback received at the GWC meeting, produce a Final Report and a Powerpoint summary (to be presented at donor meetings) - *within three months of the assignment commencement*

Qualifications Required

Two Senior consultants will be recruited for this consultancy.

Consultant 1 (Lead consultant)

The consultant will lead the consultancy and focus on Tasks 1 to 3.
- Solid backgrounds in WASH and broad knowledge and understanding of the humanitarian reform, cluster approach, Global WASH Cluster;
- Minimum of 15 years' experience in disaster preparedness, humanitarian responses and/or recovery;
- Experience working with a range of humanitarian partners (UN, NGOs, donors);
- Proven analytical capacity, strategic thinking, and ability to lead participatory processes;
- Experience working within the UN system and with WASH cluster partners;
- Fluency in English is required. Knowledge of French and Spanish is an advantage.

Consultant 2

The consultant will focus on Tasks 4 to 10.
- Solid background in marketing and resource mobilization strategy development and broad knowledge and understanding of the humanitarian reform, cluster approach;
- Minimum of 15 years' humanitarian/aid experience with key functions in resource mobilization;
- Experience working with a range of humanitarian partners (UN, NGOs, donors);
- Proven analytical capacity, strategic thinking, and ability to lead participatory processes;
- Experience working within the UN system and with WASH cluster partners;
- Fluency in English is required. Knowledge of French and Spanish is an advantage.

Duty Station

The consultants will be home-based with regular travel to Geneva for meetings.

Annex 2 List of Consultations

SAG		Cluster Members		
CAST	Dominique Porteaud	CDC	Tom Handzel	
CAST	Franck Bouvet	CRS	Rolando Wallusche	
CAST	Emma Tuck	Concern	Dominic Crawley	
SAG	Andy Bastable, Oxfam	Goal	Ammar Fawzi	
SAG	Robert Fraser, IFRC	IFRC	William Carter	
SAG	Nick Brooks, Care	IMC	Sayed Yasir Ahmed	
SAG	Murray Burt, UNHCR	InterAction	Caroline Nichols	
SAG	Jean Lapegue, ACF	IOM	Nuno Nunes	
SAG	Tim Grieve, UNICEF	IRC	Liz Walker	
		Medair	Colin McCubbin	
Academic		Mentor Initiative	Richard Allen	
WEDC	Brian Reed	NCA	Kit Dyer	
London STM	Lauren DMello-Guyett	NRC	Rick Bauer	
Tufts	Daniele Lantagne	Plan	Raul Rodriguez	
		RedR UK	Harriet Purchas	Kate Robertson
Observers		Samaritans Purse	Janet Ausel	Paul Mungai
MSF B	Peter Maes	Save the Children	Abraham Varampath	
ICRC	Evaristo De Pinho Oliveira	Solidarites	Thierry Benlahsen	Anne-Lise Lavaur
		UNHabitat	Graham Alibaster	
		UNHCR	Murray Burt	
FST		Unicef	Tim Grieves	Andrew Parker
FST Manager	Radostina Karalanova	WVI	Godfrey Mawaa	
		Oxfam		
		Humananitarian		
IFRC	Robert Fraser	Director	Nigel Timmins	
NCA	Arild Isaksen			
ACF	Jean Lapegue	Global Cluster	Nutrition - Josephine Ippe	
IMPACT/REACH	Luca Pupulin	Coordinators	Child Protection - Michael Copland	
Solidarites	Thierry Benlhan		Education - Maria Agnese Giordano	
World Vision	Godfey Mawaa		Health - Elisabetta MINELLI	
FST Members	Sven Schmitz-Leuffen		Shelter (UNHCR) - Miguel Urquia	
	Corrie Kramer		Shelter (IFRC) - Pablo Medina	
	Karine Deniel		Logistics - Stephen Cahill	
	David Alford		CCCM (HCR) - Andrew Cusack,	
			Daniela Raiman	
Longer Term WASH Actors			CCCM (IOM) - Nuno Nunes	
SWA	Alexandra Reis		Food Security - Cyril Ferrand	
			Protection - Simon Russell	
Unicef Stanby Partnership Unit		Unicef GCCU	Reuben McCarthy	
Lauren Chesire			Gavin Wood	
Julien Temple			Rami Zaki	
Stand By Partners	Other RRT Approaches			
NRC, Ulf Fink	British Red Cross	Nigel Ede	Household FE,	
MSB, Kajsa Nordmark		Tarik Begic	Global Surge HR	
DRC, Susanne Brokmose				
RedR Australia, Drasko Kraguljac		Other Organisations		
DfID, Jo Serrano		ACAPS	Lars-Peter Nissen	
Canadem, Cassandra Mathies &		ALNAP	Paul Knox-Clarke	
DSS, Jan Heegar		MapAction	Liz Hughes	
Irish Aid, John Omeara		WHO/JMP	Rick Johnston	

OCHA	Surge Capacity, Zola Dowell
	Private Sector Partnerships, Andy Andrea
	InterCluster Coordination, Lorretta Hieber-Gerardet
	Preparedness/Humanitarian Trends, Brendan McDonald

Donors		
ECHO	Deni Hiedenbrook	
OFDA	Melissa Opryszko	Trevor White
DFID	Tom White	
SDC	Marc-Andre Buenzli	

Private Sector	Luke Dokter, A-Aqua
	Thibaut Constant, Veolia

Unicef Reps	
Sikanda Khan	Dept Director EMOPs
Jonathan Veitch	ex South Sudan, Dept Director Private Sector Partnerships

Unicef Regional WASH Advisers		Unicef Staff Interviewed (Using FST/SBP in the Field)	
LACRO	Alban Nouvellon		
WCARO	Francois Bellet	Annmarie Swai	Iraq
EASARO	Georges Tabbal	Marije Broekhuijsen	Yemen
MENA	Pierre Fourcassie	Faustin EKAH	Cameroon
EAPRO	Guy Mbayo	Souleymane Sow	CAR
		Roberto Saltori	Whole of Syria
Unicef ERT Manager		Mark Buttle	Ukraine
John Paul Anderson		Marc Overmars	Fiji
		Gregor von Medeazza	State of Palestine
Unicef HR (IM)		Yasser Nasser	State of Palestine
Tamreez Amirzada		Donald Burgess	South Sudan

Other Networks - why do they work		Individuals	
GOARN	Sameera Suri	Ben Harvey	ex Cluster Coordinator
		Gwyn Lewis	ex GCCU
		Paul Sherlock	ex GCC
		Sabine Bhanot	ex OCHA - Collective Leadership

Annex 3 Example Accountability Framework

WASH Cluster Structure	CLA (Senior Rep)	Senior Advisory Group	SAG	CAST/Global Support	Operational Agencies/ Associates	Country Clusters	Affected Population
CLA		• Annual Meeting	• Annual Meeting • Annual mapping coordination staffing at country level	• Support on Fundraising for GWC Strategy	• Representation at Annual Meeting and/or Meeting of Operational Agencies • Support FST continuity	• Representation of cluster issues at HCT • Advocacy • Sector fundraising • Coordination fundraising	• Ensure effective assessment and monitoring of WASH needs • Representation of cluster issues at HCT • Advocacy • Sector Fundraising
Senior Advisory Group	• Commitment to objectives of GWC • Sector advocate		• Effectively representing sector issues		• Effectively representing sector issues		
SAG	• Active participation and commitment to SAG	• Raising of strategic issues for discussion		• Active participation and commitment to SAG	• Regular Participation in SAG Meetings • Sharing draft Agenda ahead of meeting for inputs/comments • Sharing of minutes of meetings • Annual survey	• Posting of SAG minutes on website • Annual Survey of Needs • Evaluating results of Survey of Needs	
CAST/ Global Support	• Regular reports; financial reporting	• Annual Report • Financial Report • Regular Progress Bulletins	• Organise regular SAG meetings • Effective secretariat support		• Emergency Telecons as needed • Annual Report • Financial Report • Regular Progress Bulletins	• Annual Report • Support to coordination • Mid-Year Funding Reviews	
Operational Agencies/ Associates	• Commitment to objectives of GWC • Sector advocates		• Feedback on direction and progress of cluster • Effective participation and commitment	• Commitment to objectives of GWC • Sector advocates • Effective participation and commitment		• GWC-Country Cluster Support Teleconference as needed • Commitment to participation in country clusters • Effective dissemination of research, evidence and change policies	• Response quality monitoring and action plans • Operational Learning
Country Clusters	• Active participation in country clusters			• Indication when support is needed	• Indication when support is needed		• Response quality monitoring and action plans • Operational Learning • Transparency, participation, information, feedback mechanisms

Annex 4 Funding Received by WASH Agencies 2016 and 5-Year Average

Does not include ICRC estimated at $250m nor IFRC estimated at $115 for 2016. Does not include MSF (no separate data available for WASH). Data for affiliates of different organizations have been combined e.g. ACF, ACT, Care, Oxfam, Solidarités, WVI.

Totals for WASH Funding By Agency 2016 (according to FTS) as of 5 January 2017

No	Recipient Organization	USD
	Total:	**808,903,396**
1	United Nations Children's Fund	336,929,216
2	OXFAM	44,384,766
3	International Organization for Migration	36,672,028
4	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	34,013,605
5	World Vision	30,774,342
6	CARE	21,972,822
	Bilateral (affected government)	18,592,765
7	Save the Children	16,866,579
8	ACF	13,864,784
9	Danish Refugee Council	13,768,686
10	Norwegian Refugee Council	13,574,889
11	Solidarités	13,477,659
12	GOAL	10,573,743
13	ACT Alliance	9,302,370
14	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development	8,065,319
15	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	7,621,034
16	Kuwaiti Yemeni Relief	6,979,478
17	Mercy Corps	6,889,261
	NGOs (details not yet provided)	5,960,409
18	Japan Emergency NGO	5,706,363
19	Direct Aid	5,478,970
	Various Recipients (details not yet provided)	5,411,489
20	Concern Worldwide	5,157,129
21	Première Urgence – Aide Médicale Internationale	5,156,185
22	Humanitaires sans Frontières	5,000,001
23	Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates	4,933,555
24	Premiere Urgence	4,675,270
25	Arche Nova E.V. – Initiative for People in Need	4,528,934
26	MEDAIR	4,210,654
27	International Medical Corps	4,200,719
28	International Rescue Committee	4,151,417
29	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	4,085,489
30	Technisches Hilfswerk (THW)	3,865,242
31	International Committee of the Red Cross	3,586,417
32	Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (German Agro Action)	3,290,994
33	Rebuild and Relief International NGO gGmbH	2,984,934
34	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	2,887,576
35	Polish Humanitarian Action	2,832,541
36	Catholic Relief Services	2,756,668
37	Islamic Relief Worldwide	2,717,399
38	Help – Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V.	2,697,467
39	Rebuild Iraq Recruitment Program	2,315,611
40	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	2,292,989

5-Year Totals for WASH Funding (2012-16 according to FTS) as of 5 January 2017

- Does not include ICRC nor IFRC; does not include MSF (no data available for WASH)

- Data for affiliates of different organizations have been combined, e.g. ACF, ACT, Care, Oxfam, Solidarités and WVI.

	Recipient Organization	USD
	Total:	**2,913,024,116**
1	United Nations Children's Fund	1,077,479,163
2	OXFAM	240,130,236
3	Solidarités International	108,217, 845
4	International Organization for Migration	93,986,902
5	ACF	92,236,227
	Various Recipients (details not yet provided)	83,918,424
6	CARE	73,282,120
7	Save the Children	70,151,426
8	World Vision	67,619,774
9	ACT Alliance	65,941,471
10	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development	46,170,899
11	International Rescue Committee	43,692,868
12	Norwegian Refugee Council	42,654,216
13	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	34,957,719
	Bilateral (affected government)	33,726,959
14	Concern Worldwide	32,833,864
15	Mercy Corps	29,062,670
16	Danish Refugee Council	25,398,784
17	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	23,759,142
18	GOAL	23,021,303
19	World Health Organization	21,176,067
20	MEDAIR	20,998,459
	NGOs (details not yet provided)	19,598,517
21	TEARFUND	19,313,152
22	Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (German Agro Action)	18,694,095
23	Catholic Relief Services	18,046,329
24	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees	15,990,423
25	Islamic Relief	15,469,875
26	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	15,265,537
27	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	14,805,875
28	Cooperazione Internazionale – COOPI	13,377,511
29	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	13,196,322
30	Polish Humanitarian Action	12,814,070
31	American Refugee Committee	12,715,590
32	Help – Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V.	11,212,403
33	International Medical Corps	11,019,678
34	Samaritan's Purse	10,889,654
35	United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)	10,641,683
36	Plan International	10,206,247
37	Qatar Red Crescent Society	8,534,794
38	Japan Emergency NGO	8,498,404
39	Triangle Génération Humanitaire	8,416,714
40	Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates	8,174,249

Annex 5 Financial Tracking Services (FTS) Data for WASH

WASH Appeal Request and Funding 2000-16 ($)

A bar chart shows Requested ($) and Received ($) values for years 2000–2016, with the vertical axis ranging from 0 to 1,400,000,000.

Legend: ■ Requested ($) ■ Received ($)

A line chart for years 2000–2016 with vertical axis from 0 to 80.

Legend:
- Ave % Funding All Sectors
- Ave % Funding WASH
- % Overall Funding for WASH

Comparison of Sector Appeal Funding (%) 2000-2016

— Appeal Ave % Funding All Sectors — Shelter — WASH — Health — Food

Comparison of Sector Appeal Funding as Percentage of all Appeal Funding

— % Overall Funding for WASH — % Overall Funding for Shelter
— % Overall Funding for Health — % Overall Funding for Food Security

Nigeria 2016

fts Financial Tracking Service

Funding progress by cluster/sector

22–NOV–2016

Camp coordination and camp management
Coordination and support services
Early recovery
Education
Emergency shelter and nfi
Food security
Health
Nutrition
Protection
Water and sanitation

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Funding progress

$21.7m

$7.1m

$7m

CCM: Camp coordination and management NFI: Non-food items

Cluster not yet specified: US$31,352,864

Take me to this data

77

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Annex 6   Overall Funding Requested and Funding Received, Inside and Outside of Humanitarian Response Plans for the Last 10 Years

Year	Inside response plan/appeal (US$)	Outside response plan/appeal (US$)	Total Funding (US$)		% Outside Appeal
2006	3,460,470,646	4,201,929,180	7,662,399,826		55
2007	3,718,861,110	4,191,983,456	7,910,844,566		53
2008	5,156,992,408	6,703,431,409	11,860,423,817		57
2009	6,983,609,060	5,405,708,706	12,389,317,766		44
2010	7,237,360,207	8,944,895,208	16,182,255,415		55
2011	5,641,216,864	7,881,659,430	13,522,876,294		58
2012	5,739,934,666	7,229,305,952	12,969,240,618		56
2013	8,327,414,494	6,210,384,772	14,537,799,266		43
2014	10,836,177,903	13,452,089,151	24,288,267,054		55
2015	10,740,871,877	9,576,167,735	20,317,039,612		47
2016	11,160,813,236	11,291,247,270	22,452,060,506		50

Source (Financial Tracking System)

Total reported funding in 2016 represents funding reported for the year at 9 January 2016.

Annex 7 Funding of All Appeals by Sector Compared to Funding Received Outside of Appeals in 2016

	Sector	Response plan/appeal funding (US$)	Total requirements (US$)	% Appeal Total Received		Actual Amount Funded to Sector (inside & outside of Appeal)	% of All Funding Received (inside & outside of Appeals)		If All Funds were directed to the Appeal, % of Appeal that would be funded
1	Coordination and support services	436,680,797	781,424,108	1		1,747,481,990	7.8		223.63%
2	Multi-sector	2,972,430,588	5,558,919,560	1		4,051,329,142	18.1		72.88%
3	Food	2,408,697,746	4,804,735,588	1		4,395,405,426	19.7		91.48%
4	Education	289,295,614	636,513,501	0		419,735,221	1.9		65.94%
5	Health	1,011,520,590	2,402,899,863	0		1,696,548,629	7.6		70.60%
6	Water and sanitation	482,403,120	1,222,887,607	0		808,903,396	3.6		66.15%
7	Protection/human rights/rule of law	374,316,412	1,127,015,021	0		768,282,526	3.4		68.17%
8	Agriculture	181,426,905	638,440,563	0		262,872,598	1.2		41.17%
9	Safety and security of staff and operations	2,387,035	8,977,936	0		48,331,597	0.2		538.34%
10	Economic recovery and infrastructure	181,601,293	780,263,318	0		531,479,248	2.4		68.12%
11	Shelter and non-food items	356,405,590	1,606,547,933	0		617,340,222	2.8		38.43%
12	Mine action	16,877,999	103,481,647	0		60,645,979	0.3		58.61%
13	Sector not yet specified	2,382,732,331				6,935,050,453	31		-
		$ 11,096,776,020	$ 19,672,106,645			$ 22,343,406,427			

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Annex 8 Mapping of Global Cluster Coordination Structures

Annex 9 Review of UNICEF Cluster Utilisation of RRT(FST) and SBP Mechanisms

2016

Cluster	# Countries	# Deployments	# Days	Personnel	# CC deployments	# days	# IM deployments	# Days	# Assessment deployments	# Days	Agencies (source: GCCU dashboard)
WASH RRT	17	25	1,169	13	11	594	10	436			ACF, NCA, Impact, WVI, Oxfam, MSB, SI
WASH SBP	7	11	1,718	11	7	1179	3	251	0		ACF, Impact, NCA, DRC, RedR Aus, NEA, MSB, Canadem, SDC
Education RRT	6	15	452	8	5	173	6	819	0		NRC, Save, NCA, FCA, NRC, DRC, iMMAP, Irish Aid
Education SBP	5	8	1,090	8	2	271	5	215	0		
CP RRT	8	11	493	6	5	282	5	188	0		SDC, Childfund, NRC, iMMAP
CP SBP	8	8	985	7	3	193	2	299	0		SDC, NRC, MSB, DRC, PROCAP, RedR Aus
Nutrition RRT	8	12	543	6	5	285	5	250	0		ACF, IMC, Save, WVI
Nutrition SBP	4	4	479	4	1	134	2	222	0	69	ACF, NRC, iMMAP

	#	# Days	Personnel	# CC deployments	# days	# IM deployments	# Days	# Assessment deployments	# Days
Total Deployments from RRTs (all clusters)	63	2657	33	26	1334	26	1693	3	84
Total Deployments from SBP (all clusters)	31	4272	30	13	1777	11	987	1	69
Total Deployments RRT and SBP (all clusters)	94	6929	63	39	3111	37	2680	4	153

2016

Cluster	% deployments for each mechanism	% Deployments for CC for each mechanism	% deployments for IM for each mechanism	% deployments for Assessment for each mechanism		% Days for all Deployments	% CC Days for all Mechanisms	% IM Days for all mechanisms	% Assessment Days for all RRT deployments
WASH RRT	69%	61%	77%	100%		40%	34%	63%	100%
WASH SBP	31%	39%	23%	0%		60%	39%	37%	0%
Education RRT	65%	71%	55%	0%		29%	39%	79%	0%
Education SBP	35%			0%					0%
CP RRT	58%	63%	71%	0%		33%	59%	39%	0%
CP SBP	42%			0					0
Nutrition RRT	75%	83%	83%	0%		53%	68%	53%	0%
Nutrition SBP	25%			100%					100%

% Deployments from RRTs (all clusters)
% Deployments from SBP (all clusters)
% Deployments RRT and SBP (all clusters)

2015-16

Cluster	# Countries	# Deployments	# Days	# Personnel	# CC deployments	No days	# IM deployments	# Days	# Assessment deployments	# Days
WASH RRT	20	39	1,809	17	18	890	18	780	0	84
WASH SBP	17	34	4,074	33	17	2,509	13	1,216	0	0
Education RRT	10	30	1,076	8	16	648	8	1,185	0	0
Education SBP	8	13	2,043	13	5	858	8	345	0	0
CP RRT	14	24	913	8	12	556	11	275	0	0
CP SBP	14	19	2,674	17	10	1,603	4	578	0	0
Nutrition RRT	17	28	1,302	10	15	760	10	522	0	0
Nutrition SBP	6	9	980	9	4	553	1	222	1	69

	#	# Days	Personnel	# CC deployments	No days	# IM deployments	# Days	# Assessment deployments	# Days
Total Deployments from RRT	121	5,100	44	61	5523	47	2762	3	84
Total Deployments from SBP	75	9,771	72	36	5,523	26	2361	1	69
Total Deployments RRT and SBP	196	14871	116	97	8,379	73	5123	4	153

2015-16

Cluster	% deployments for each mechanism	% Deployments for CC for each mechanism	% deployments for IM for each mechanism	% RRT of all Deployments for Assessment		% Deployment Days from each mechanism	% Deployment Days for CC for each mechanism	% Deployment Days for IM for each mechanism	% Deployment Days for assessments for each mechanism
WASH RRT	53%	51%	58%	100%		31%	26%	39%	100%
WASH SBP	47%	49%	42%	0%		69%	74%	61%	0%
Education RRT	70%	76%	50%	0%		34%	43%	77%	0%
Education SBP				0%					0%
CP RRT	56%	55%	73%	0%		25%	74%	32%	0%
CP SBP				0%					0%
Nutrition RRT	76%	79%	91%	0%		57%	58%	70%	0%
Nutrition SBP				100%					100%

Analysis By Cluster	2015-16	2016
% WASH is of all RRT Cluster Deployments	32%	40%
% WASH all all SBP ClusterDeployments	45%	35%
% WASH of all Cluster Deployments	37%	38%
% WASH of all Cluster Deployment Days (RRT & SBP)	40%	42%
% Education of all RRT Deployments	25%	24%
% Education all all SBP Deployments	17%	26%
% Education of all Cluster Deployments (RRT & SBP)	22%	24%
% Education of all Cluster Deployment Days (RRT & SBP)	21%	22%
% CP of all RRT Deployments	20%	17%
% CP all all SBP Deployments	25%	26%
% CP of all Cluster Deployment (RRT & SBP)	12%	20%
% CP of all Cluster Deployment Days (RRT & SBP)	24%	21%
% Nutrition of all RRT Deployments	23%	19%
% Nutrition all all SBP Deployments	12%	6%
% Nutrition of all Cluster Deployment (RRT & SBP)	13%	17%
% Nutrition of all Cluster Deployment Days (RRT & SBP)	15%	15%

	Ave Deployment Days WASH - FST		Ave Deployment Days WASH - SBP	
	2015-16	2016	2015-16	2016
All	46	47	120	156
CC	49	54	148	168
IM	43	44	94	84

All (RRT and SBP) Deployments		2015-16	2016
% CC for all WASH Deployments		48%	50%
% IM for all WASH Deployents		42%	36%
% Assessment for all WASH Deployments		4%	8%

Analysis Between RRT and SBPs for All Clusters		2015-16	2016
% Deployments from RRTs (all clusters)		62%	67%
% Deployments from SBP (all clusters)		38%	33%
% Deployment Days from RRTs (all clusters)		34%	38%
% Deployment Days from SBP (all clusters)		66%	62%

Annex 10 Mapping of UNICEF Staffing Mechanisms Used for WASH Coordination

Countries with WASH Humanitarian	Cluster Approach activated	Active WASH Sector Coordination	WASH Cluster Coordinator – Int'l FT Ded	DH	Int'l TA Ded	DH	Int'l Consultancy Ded	DH	Nat'l SBP Ded	DH	Nat'l FST Ded	DH	Nat'l FT Ded	DH	Nat'l TA Ded	DH	Nat'l Consultancy Ded	DH	Info Mgr Int'l FT Ded	DH	Int'l TA Ded	DH	Int'l Consultancy Ded	DH	Int'l SBP Ded	DH	Int'l FST Ded	DH	Nat'l FT Ded	DH	Nat'l TA Ded	DH	Nat'l Consultancy Ded	DH
CEE-CIS																													1	1				
Ukraine	X		1										1																1	1				
Latin America-Caribbean																																		
Haïti		X	2				2																											
Colombia	X												1																					
Ecuador		X			3																				1		1							
Bolivia		X											1																					
Paraguay		X											1																					
Cuba		X																																
Dominican Republic		X					1																											
El Salvador		X											1																					
Guatemala		X											1																					
Honduras		X											1																					
Peru		X											1																					
Nicaragua		X											1																					
Middle-East North Afria																																		
Iraq	X				1				1																						2			
Jordan	X		1																												1			
Lebanon	X				1								3				1																	
Libya							1																											
Palestine	X						1		1				1		1																		1	
Syria	X		2	1					2				1	3			1													1				
Yemen	X		1	2					2	5																					1	5		
Djibouti	X		1																															
Sudan	X		1																						1									
South Asia																																		
Bangladesh	X		1																						1									
Pakistan	X												1																					
Afghanistan	X		1																															
Nepal	X*	X											1																					
East Asia and Pacific																																		
Myanmar	X		1				1						1	2											1									
Laos													1																					
Philippines	X*	X	1																						1									
Solomon Island		X											1																					
Vanuatu		X					1		1																									
Vietnam	X*	X	1						1					1																				
Cambodia		X	1										1																					
Indonesia		X	1											1																				
Fiji	X*	X	1		1								1																					
DPRK	X*	X	1																															
Mongolia		X											1*																					
Papua New Guinea		X	1						1																									
East & Southern Africa																																		
Burundi					1																													
Ethiopia							2						8		1																11			
Kenya			1																															
Madagascar			1																															
Malawi							1																											
Somalia	X		1						1																1									
South Sudan	X		1										1				1																	
Swaziland													1																					
Lesotho							1																											
Mozambique			1																						1									
Zimbabwe							1																											
West and Central Africa																																		
CAR	X				1																				1									
Chad	X												1																					
Nigeria	X		1														1																	
Niger	X												1																					
Mali	X						1																											
RDC	X		1																								1							
Burkina		X											1																					
Cameroun		X											1																					
Guinee		X											1																					
Mauritania		X											1																					
Liberia		X											1																					
Total			9	20	4	6	4	3	6	2	0	0	7	34	7	7	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	6	3	3	1	12	6

Legend:
Ded – Dedicated
DH – Double Hat
FST – Field Support Team
FT – Fixed Term
TA – Temporary Appointment

Consultancies - Yemen are NGO Partner with PCA/Unicef

X* Activated when catastrophy strikes

X* Activated whenever a catastrophy strikes

1 WASH Chief or Manager (Indicated for ROSA/EAPRO)

Annex 11 Mapping of Coordination Costs in Appeals

	Mapping of Coordination in of Humanitarian Response Plans & Flash Appeals				UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children Appeals		
	Humanitarian Response Plan/Flash Appeal	WASH Coordination Budget Specified	Coordination Mentioned in WASH Strategy		Total Budget Request ($)	Budget Request for Coordination ($)	% Coordination of Total Request
1	Afghanistan 2016	0	1		30,500,000	1,000,000	3%
2	Burkina Faso 2016	0	0		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
3	Burundi 2016	0	1		18,500,000	250,000	1%
4	Cameroon 2016	0	1		23,700,000	1,200,000	5%
5	Central African Republic 2016	0	1		46,300,000	800000	2%
6	Chad 2016	0	1		57,300,000	1,200,000	2%
7	Democratic Republic of the Congo 2016	0	0		119,000,000	1,500,000	1%
8	Djibouti 2016	0	0		34,000,000	20,000	0%
9	Gambia 2016	0	0		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
10	Guatemala 2016	0	1		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
11	Haiti 2016	0	0		42,300,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
12	Honduras 2016	0	0		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
13	Iraq 2016	0	0		161,400,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
14	Libya 2015-2016	0	1		15,000,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
15	Mali 2016	0	1		35,200,000	850,000	2%
16	Mauritania 2016	1	1		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
17	Myanmar 2016	0	1		25,000,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
18	Niger 2016	0	1		37,000,000	1,000,000	3%
19	Nigeria 2016	0	1		147,000,000	3,800,000	3%
20	occupied Palestinian territory 2016	1	1		24,500,000	1,400,000	6%
21	Republic of South Sudan 2016	0	1		181,000,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
	Sahel 2016	NA	NA		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
22	Senegal 2016	0	0		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
23	Somalia 2016	0	0		66,000,000	1,300,000	2%
24	Sudan 2016	0	0		110,000,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
25	Syria Humanitarian Response Plan 2016	1	1		355,000,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
26	Ukraine 2016	0	1		31,000,000	500,000	2%
27	Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2016	1	1		236,000,000	Not Explicit	Not Explicit
28	Zimbabwe Humanitarian Response Plan 2016	0	1		No HAC	No HAC	No HAC
	Regional Response Plans					13 (48%)	
	Syria regional refugee and resilience plan (3RP) 2016	NA	NA				
	Flash appeals						
29	Afghanistan Flash Appeal: One million people on the move (September - December 2016)	0	0				
30	Ecuador Earthquake Flash Appeal 2016	0	0				
31	Fiji Tropical Cyclone Flash Appeal 2016	0	1				
32	Haiti Flash Appeal: Hurricane Matthew 2016	0	0				
33	Libya - Sirte Flash Appeal 2016	0	0				
34	Mosul Flash Appeal 2016	0	0				
	Other appeals						
	2016 Europe Situation -Regional Refugee and Migrant Response	NA	NA				
35	DPR Korea Needs and Priorities 2016	0	0				
	Totals	4	19				
	Percentage (%) of Response Plans/Flash Appeals	11%	54%				